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ABSTRACT

Herennius Philo and the Dilemma of Lexicography
by
Alec Smitten, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Mark Damen
Department: History

This thesis examines the history of lexicography in the Greek tradition,
beginning with Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE) and ending in the Byzantine period,
principally focusing on De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, the epitome of a
lexicon written by Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). While early Greek
lexicographers opted for a more restrained and descriptive approach, Philo, intending
to correct what he saw as common errors in the language, chose a highly prescriptive
one, to the point of explicity criticizing Greek speakers from the previous centuries,
such as Euripides, Callimachus, Menander, and even Homer. Despite his efforts, the
Greek language continued to change, which raises a significant question about the
purpose and function of lexicography, both in the Greek tradition and in general.
(114 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Herennius Philo and the Dilemma of Lexicography
Alec Smitten

This thesis seeks to explore De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, the surviving
epitome of the lexicon of Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). By placing
Philo in the timeline of Greek lexica, his prescriptive style and desire for absolute
correctness in speech stands out among other lexicographers, and raises this question:
what is the purpose of a dictionary, to describe how words are used, or to define
“correct” usage?
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INTRODUCTION
It is no exaggeration to say that lexica, compilations of words and their
meanings, belong to one of the oldest genres of scholarship. From as early as the third
millennium BCE, we find the roots of what would ultimately become the idea of a
lexicon. This tradition continued after Babylonians took over Sumeria and created
correspondence lists of Akkadian words and Sumerian words. The Hittites too found
the need to create systematic equivalences between words, producing tablets with
Hittite, Sumerian, and Akkadian correspondences. As Rudolf Pfeiffer explains, “The
keepers of the clay tablets who had to preserve the precious texts attached importance
to the exact wording of the originals and tried to correct mistakes of the copyists; for
that reason they even compiled ‘glossaries’ of a sort.”1 In other words, no pun
intended, from some of our earliest recorded history, there has been great meaning
attached to the words themselves which we use.
This need to understand words is not unique to the Near East. In the Vedic
tradition, Nirukta, one of the Vedangas, that is, one of the “limbs” of scholarly study,
is dedicated to etymology and the correct understanding of words, in particular
archaic or infrequently occurring words, and can be tracked back as far as the end of
the second millennium BCE.2 For reasons perhaps similar to the Sumerians’, those in
India found a similar need to preserve and explain the meanings of words in texts to
which they attached importance. It comes as no surprise, then, that the noun niruktiḥ
connected to nirukta means “explanation of a word,” in other words, “definition.”

1

Rudolf Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the
Hellenistic Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 18.
2
Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume 5
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 105.
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What is it that drives humanity towards compiling these lists of words and
their meanings, often in multiple languages? And who is to say on what basis the
created word-lists are complete or correct?
By the time of written literature in western civilization, there is clear evidence
of interest in the meanings of words. Plato’s Cratylus is a dialogue deeply invested in
the philosophical implications of words and their relationship to reality, and the orator
Prodicus (ca. 465-395 BCE) was fascinated by the distinctions between synonyms and
their applications in political oratory.3 The comedian Aristophanes (ca. 446-386
BCE), too, explored the effect of words. In his play Clouds, for instance, Socrates
presents Strepsiades with two chickens, and although he claims that Strepsiades
wrongly identifies them both as chickens when one is actually “chicken-ness,” neither
character questions the meaning of alektruon (“chicken”).4 Even Aristotle, in his
Rhetoric and Poetics, could not escape the fascination of understanding words and
what they mean.5
By the time of the Alexandrian scholars in the fourth and third centuries,
dictionaries as we would recognize them in the modern sense of the term began to
appear. The desire to retain an understanding of the older words in classical Greek
dialects and the necessity of understanding new words from recently Hellenized areas
gave ample incentive for scholars to devise lexica. Yet even as they were trying to
cement the Greek language and its rules into stable, lexical forms, the ground was
shifting under their feet. Slowly but inexorably, the language of Homer was beginning
to sound more arcane and archaic.

3
4
5

Plato, Euthyd. 277 e, Crat. 384 b.
Aristophanes, Clouds, 660-666.
Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship, 77.
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During the second century CE, “Atticist Lexica” first appear. These, unlike
previous lexica such as that of Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE), were
not only reference materials which explained the meanings of words but also didactic
tools that explained “correct” usage. However, as quickly as they came about, this
brand of lexicon disappeared. It was during this brief moment that Herennius Philo of
Byblos lived. He was a Hellenized Phoenician scholar who, among other things,
created a lexicon of this sort.
The object of this research is to examine how lexica evolved in the Greek
tradition and in particular to explain the important role Philo played in this brief
period. His lexicon provides unique insight into the evolution of dictionaries, both in
Greek and more broadly. Although Philo was unsuccessful in keeping classical
dialects alive and tamping down solecisms ― which appears to have been his
ambition ― what survives of his lexicon offers valuable insight into the mind-set of
those who felt compelled to take on the task of systematically defining and
differentiating words.
To this end, I will track the development of lexica in the Greek tradition,
beginning in the first chapter with one of the earliest texts which we can confidently
identify as a proper lexicon: the Ataktoi Glossai of the poet and scholar Philitas of
Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE). In the wake of his work, lexicography started developing into
a proper academic enterprise, embodied in particular by the Lexeis of Aristophanes of
Byzantium. Lexicographers, however, were not the only scholars who spent time
thinking about words, their meanings, and their uses. As Didymus Chalcenterus (ca.
63 BCE – 10 CE) highlighted in his Homeric scholia, questions about word use
permeated Alexandrian scholarship, in particular, the way they pertained to textual
criticism and correctness of language.

4
The second chapter of this thesis entails a detailed analysis of De Diversis
Verborum Significationibus, the lexicon of Herennius Philo as it is preserved in an
epitome. The initial discussion will detail what information we have about his life and
will attempt to place him in the larger scholarly timeline of ancient lexicography. This
will require some attention to our only source for Philo’s text, Ammonius
Grammaticus’ epitome of a presumably much larger work by Philo titled Peri
Diaphorous Semasias (“On Differences of Meaning”). Unlike his previous works, this
one is structured more like a modern dictionary, with some important differences.
Here, Philo includes commentary regarding correct usage of the words he defines and,
contrary to the practices of his predecessors, he shows a keen interest in making
prescriptive claims about the use of words, even claiming predecessors and
contemporaries misused them at times.
Based on this, I will conclude that Philo intended, at least to some extent, to
use lexica to keep the older, classical form of Greek “alive,” if not in a spoken form,
at least among literate Greeks. Philo thus represents a last stand for those who wished
to preserve classical Greek not as an antiquarian artifact preserved only for those
interested in antiquity but as an important cultural attribute in this day.
This chapter will also examine the lexicon created by Ammonius
Grammaticus during the fourth century, the same man who made the epitome of
Philo’s original work. Although there are a great many correspondences between the
epitome and Ammonius’ complete text, there are also significant and notable
differences, chief among them that Ammonius largely avoids the prescriptive tone
adopted by Philo, and in some cases even removes the admonitions he encountered in
his model.

5
The final chapter will offer a brief history of lexicography after Philo’s time.
Looking at the broader context of Greek scholarship, we will see that Ammonius is
something of an outlier. In the centuries following his lifetime, lexica trended away
from his highly prescriptive style and instead drifted back toward gloss-making. Thus,
despite his efforts to amend modern practice in his day, Herennius Philo was unable
to halt the changes affecting the Greek language in the second century. In conclusion,
this chapter will also attempt to reconcile this failure with the nature of lexicography
itself and the ongoing struggle over the fundamental function of dictionaries. Should
they prescribe correct usage or only describe the practice of language then and now?
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CHAPTER 1: Lexicography before Philo

1. Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE)
Both modern and ancient scholars remember Philitas (or Philetas6) of Cos
primarily as one of the earliest elegiac poets. Although his verse now survives only in
fragments, he remained an important figure throughout most of antiquity. He is said to
have been the teacher of other poets such as Hermesianax, Theocritus, and even
Zenodotus, the eventual head of the Library of Alexandria.7 His poetry was itself
deeply influential. Philitas’ influence on Callimachus was “pervasive,” and his reach
extended even into the realm of Latin poetry, affecting Propertius and Vergil. 8
Quintilian ranked Philitas a close second to Callimachus.9
Today, we know little about him. He wrote a work called Demeter, which
details the goddess’ search for her daughter Persephone in elegiac couplets, and
another entitled Hermes, a hexameter poem describing Odysseus’ meeting with
Aeolus and subsequent affair with Aeolus’ daughter. He also composed a collection
of poems written in the style of epigrams and entitled Paignia. Philitas, however, was
not solely a poet. In fact, his other scholarly pursuits seem to have been as wellregarded as his poetry.
There is evidence suggesting that during his life and after, he was known for
his study of lexicography. In the third century BCE, the comic poet Strato references
Philitas in a scene of his play Phoenicides, in which a cook insists on using Homeric

6
7
8
9

Both spellings of the name are attested, but “Philitas” appears to be more frequently used.
Konstantinos Spanoudakis, Philitas of Cos (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 29, 40.
Ibid. 42, 59, 66.
Quintilian, 10.1.56.
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archaisms and forces his master “to take the books of Philitas and look up each word
to find its meaning.”10
Although the name itself is problematical, of particular interest is his Ataktoi
Glossai, the “Disorderly Glossary.” Although it survives only in fragments, we can
gather some sense of the original document.11 For instance, the word kupellon occurs
ten times in Homer and is regularly translated as “goblet;” in five of those instances it
is paired with the epithet “golden.”12 According to Athenaeus, “Philitas says the
Syracusans call the remnants of barley cake and bread left on the table kupella.”13
From this, it is clear that something is amiss with the definition of kupellon, which is,
no doubt, what attracted Philitas’ attention.
Another example is the word kreion, a hapax within Homer, which appears to
have radically different meanings. The Homeric sense of this word is evident from
Iliad 9.206, “So he spoke, and Patroclus trusted his dear comrade. Then he put down a
large kreion into the light of the fire, and placed on it a sheep’s back and a fat
goat’s.”14 Kreion here seems to refer to some sort of surface on which one can prepare
meat, what we might term a “butcher block.” Philitas, however, provides a very
different understanding, again as transmitted through Athenaeus: “kreion is a flat
bread which Argives bring (as a gift) from the bride to the groom. It is baked on

10

Austin, Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta, Fragment 219, 42-44.
Many such as Bachius and Pfeiffer have argued, as early as 1829 and as recently as 1968, that
the adjective ataktos should be understood as meaning that the glossary itself was disorderly –
inordinata – in the sense that it was not alphabetized. In all likelihood, this statement is correct, since
properly alphabetized lexica did not become the norm until long after Philitas’ lifetime. In more recent
years, there has been increasing resistance to this line of thinking from scholars who argue that the
sense of ataktos does not refer to the organizational scheme of the glossary, but the words themselves.
Upon examination of the fragments, it appears that Philitas is taking interest in words with variable and
often inconsistent meanings, in other words, glossai which are themselves “disorderly.” It is, however,
also plausible that both meanings of the word were intended.
12
Il. 1.596, 3.248, 4.345, 9.670, 24, 305; Od. 1.142, 2.396, 4.58, 10.357, 20.253.
13
Athenaeus 11.483a.
14
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
11

8
charcoal, and the friends are invited to partake of it, and it is served with honey. So
says Philitas in the Ataktoi.”15
Yet another example of an inconsistent Homeric word which caught Philitas’
attention and was quoted in Athenaeus is the word pella, “Cleitarchus in his Glosses
says the Thessalians and the Aeolians call a milk pail pelleter, but a cup a pella.
Philitas in his Ataktoi says a wine cup (kulix) is called a pella by the Boeotians.”16
Once again, we see another instance of Philitas’ habit of identifying peculiar usages of
otherwise attested words, with special attention to their provenance in the Greekspeaking world. In fact, nearly half of the grammatical fragments of Philitas in
Spanoudakis make mention of the fact that the word in question is used in a particular
region or regional dialect.
His attraction to curious words went beyond simply their surface meaning and
extended to even finer details. In Hesychius, a crucial Byzantine lexicographer, we
find a gloss for the word amalla (“sheaf”), which is found in the Homeric compound
amallodeteres and means, according to Bing, “those who bind the amalla.”17 The
gloss reads, “amalla: sheaves, bundles of grain, a bunch, one hundred sheaves
according to Istros; Philitas, though, says two hundred.”18 From this, the sense of
amalla is clearly some sort of measure of grain. Philitas, however, felt the need to go
out of his way to specify the precise number of sheaves. This suggests that Philitas’
work is not just an exercise in analyzing random, peculiar vocabulary. Instead, his
objective appears to have been to collect unconventional words or their usages and
incorporate them into his own verse. A natural consequence of this would have been

15

Athenaeus, 14.645d.
Athenaeus, 9.495e.
17
Peter Bing, “The Unruly Tongue: Philitas of Cos as Scholar and Poet,” Classical Philology 98,
no. 4 (2003): 334, https://doi:10.1086/422370.
18
Hesychius, alpha 3417.
16
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the need to provide explanations of the meanings of such words. The scholarship
underlying the Ataktoi Glossai, then, is not so much Philitas’ primary objective as an
appropriate complement to his poetry.
In two fragments, the words discussed are explicitly cited in a poetic context.
The first comes again from Hesychius and reads, “Skuzes: in Philitas, ‘I will keep you
from your skuzes,’ instead of ‘your kapras.’”19 Since kapra is itself an uncommon
word, Hesychius also provides a gloss of this term, saying it is synonymous with
akolasia, “licentiousness.”20 This citation suggests that Hesychius is directly quoting
Philitas, who, in turn, appears to be referencing an unknown comedy.21 The second
comes from Strabo in the form of a comment on an elegiac couplet attributed to
Philitas in another of his works, the Hermeneia: “A wretched, dirtied tunic, a tie of
plaited black rushes (melankraninon) has been wrapped around a slender belly.”22 The
word melankraninon is peculiar, and indeed Spanoudakis notes that compounds
formed from melas- (“black” or “dark”) often create Homeric hapaxes, so it is
unsurprising to see a poet with a fascination with uncommon words forming his own
adjective modelled on a Homeric precedent.23 Unlike the previous examples,
however, this is an instance of Philitas using his own neologism in a poetic context.
This couplet does not appear to be anomalous, since in the Demeter, Philitas
demonstrates a pattern of using words which are either peculiar cult-epithets of
deities, or words which are infrequently attested, even some hapaxes. Among the
fragments of this work is an unusual epithet for Demeter, ompnia thesmophoros

19

Hesychius, sigma 1148.
Hesychius, kappa 738.
21
Spanoudakis, Philitas, 376.
22
Strabo 3.5.1, II.83, Λευγαλέος δὲ χιτὼν πεπινωμένος, ἀμφὶ δ’ ἀραιὴ / ἰξὺς εἴλυται ῥάμμα
μελαγκράνινον. This word is surely related to melankranis, the plant we call “black bog-rush.”
23
Spanoudakis, Philitas, 151.
20
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(“nurturing law-giver”). Believed to come near the beginning of the work, ompnios is
an Attic word of uncertain etymology which Philitas is said to have explained in his
Ataktoi Glossai.24 Hesychius glosses ompnia as meaning trophe (“nurturing”) or
karpophoros (“fruit-bearing”), clearly interpreting this epithet as a reference to the
generative and agricultural qualities of the goddess.25 One plausible explanation for
Philitas’ attraction to this word is its similarity to the more common and metrically
identical epithet of Demeter, potnia (“revered”). In fact, the opening to Pindar’s Hymn
to Persephone reads, Potnia Thesmophore.26 Spanoudakis goes so far as to say,
“Philitas might have been the first to use a dialectal word denoting plenty as an
epithet of Demeter.”27 The importance of this intersection between scholarship and
poetry should not be overlooked. Philitas is augmenting his poetry by combining an
obscure epithet for Demeter (ompnia) with one which has strong literary precedent
(potnia). Then to ensure readers understand his choice, he includes an explanation for
the obscure terminology in Ataktoi Glossai.
Philitas’ usage of regionalisms did not stop there. Elsewhere he describes
Dionysus as bougenes (“bull-born”) which is, according to Spanoudakis, “a
specifically Argive cult-epithet of Dionysus referring to his oxen-like appearance.”28
Although this word is attested in two predecessors, Socrates of Argos and
Empedocles, Philitas’ use of a rare and regionally specific cult-epithet is conspicuous
in light of the other instances in which he pays special attention to words from
different parts of the Greek-speaking world. This is echoed when Philitas uses
aemma, related to hamma (“cord”), in reference to both Artemis and Apollo. This

24
25
26
27
28

Ibid. 142.
Hesychius, omicron 828.
Pindar, Hymn to Persephone, fr. 37.
Spanoudakis, Philitas, 142.
Ibid. 184-185.
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word seems to have originated in or around Crete, since Callimachus later uses it in
the name of a Cretan archer, Echemmas, “he who has an aemma.”29
Furthermore, it appears that Philitas paid attention not only to the regional
qualities of words, but their structure as well. As with the melas-compounds, there is
evidence that Philitas had Homeric precedent in mind when pursuing lexical flare in
his poetry. To this point, in another fragment of the Demeter, Philitas appears to have
invented a new adjective, nechuton (“abundant”). As Spanoudakis explains,
compound adjectives built from the prefix ne- find their basis in the Homeric corpus,
and, although this prefix often acts with a negative force, Hellenistic Greeks later
viewed it as having an intensifying force.30
Perhaps one of the most obscure Homericisms in Philitas comes in an epithet
of Athena, dolichaoros, used only once elsewhere, and equivalent to the hapax
dolichegches in Homer, meaning “with a long spear.”31 As opposed to the Homeric
term, Philitas constructs his adjective from another term, one that rarely occurs
outside of Homer, aor, which refers to any pointed weapon.32 Indeed, it appears
Philitas not only employed adjective-forming prefixes and suffixes found in Homer,
but also Homeric vocabulary in general. Thus, Philitas not only displays a proclivity
for utilizing rare vocabulary in poetry, as he did with ompnia, but also for creating
neologisms based on archaic linguistic formulae as with nechuton and melankraninon.
In other words, he both gathered and invented exotic words which he used in his
poems and later explicated in his lexicon.

29
30
31
32

Ibid. 193.
Ibid. 154.
Il. 21.155.
Spanoudakis, Philitas, 219.
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The picture of Philitas, then, is of a man who was both poet and lexicographer.
Given that his verse fragments outnumber quotes from his lexicon, he seems to have
been better remembered as the former; however, the quotation from Strato makes
clear that Philitas’ lexicographic work had enough of an audience that a comic poet
could joke about it. As Pfeiffer says, “his persona must somehow have been familiar
to the Athenian audience.”33 In this way, Philitas occupies a fascinating moment in
the history of lexicography, one in which the distinction between lexicography proper
(the formal academic enterprise) and localized lexicography used as a tool for
exploring language was beginning to form. While fascination with the meanings of
words and glosses was certainly not a new phenomenon in his day, Philitas must be
ranked among the first individuals to purposely couple his scholarly enterprises with
his own poetry; as Strabo put it, poietes hama kai kritikos, “a poet and also a
scholar.”34
In this regard, Philitas stands in marked contrast to later lexicographers like
Aristophanes of Byzantium who were concerned with the precise meanings of Greek
words in general. More to the point, there is little evidence to suggest that Philitas was
interested in the full breadth of Greek vocabulary as Aristophanes was. Most notably,
in strong contrast to later scholars, Philitas’ record provides no citation of sources.
While it is clear he depended on Homer for both poetic inspiration as well as
lexicographic content, Philitas does not show interest in classical authors such as
Sophocles and Euripides, whose works would serve as standard fare feeding the
engines of post-classical lexicography.

33
34

Pfeiffer, History, 91.
Strabo XIV 657 ( = test. 13 K.).
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2. Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE)
A century after Philitas, Aristophanes of Byzantium stands as a significant
figure in the history of ancient Greek lexicography, and even more important in the
history of Alexandrian scholarship in general. By all appearances, he was the first
major scholar to develop a consistent methodology for establishing the pathe (“what
befalls”) and etuma (“truth”) of words, that is, their physical transformations and
etymological origins.35 His works now exist only as fragments preserved in a wide
variety of sources. The majority appear to come from his Lexeis, a large glossary of
Greek terms, both archaic and contemporaneous, drawn from across the Greekspeaking world. Aristophanes’ lexical interest embraced a broad array of topics from
post-classical vocabulary to kinship terms to terms for certain ages in the human lifecycle.36 Unlike Philitas, Aristophanes seems to have been solely a scholar, or to
borrow Strabo’s language, kritikos ou kai poietes, “a scholar and not a poet.” To judge
from the citations of the more gloss-oriented sections of the Lexeis, he clearly paid
close attention to the texts of Homer and classical authors such as Pindar and the
tragedians whom he references by line number in order to support his interpretation of
some term. Thus, not only does he follow the more rigorous methodology associated
with modern lexicography, but he also establishes, perhaps unintentionally, what will
become the standard lexicographic canon of Greek authors from which later scholars
would often draw citations.

35

Varro, L. L. VI 2; Nauck p. 269. According to Dickey, he is also credited with being the first
editor to arrange lyric poetry into verse and notate their metrical structure. He is also credited with the
invention of theatrical hypotheses.
36
Eleanor Dickey, Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding
Scholia, Commenatries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine
Period (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93.
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Some entries are rather simple, summaries, no doubt, of Aristophanes’ original
text, for instance, “kokkuzein: used instead of aidein (to sing),”37 or, “also kokkuzein is
used of a chicken.”38 But many of the fragments are more robust, especially those
which come from Eustathius, a twelfth-century bishop of Thessalonica whose
commentary on Homer includes passages like this:
And in regard to Cratinus, he says in
his work, “They did not suffer the
chicken to cry (kokkuzein),” which is to
say aidein (to sing) as is appropriate
for him. And for this reason, the
kokkux is said to kokkuzein in Hesiod.
And the adverb kokku is used in
comedy. Even Sophocles suggests such
a thought, and says in his work, “the
kokkuboas bird.” Diphilos says more
clearly in his work, “And indeed, by
Zeus, in fact, an orthriokokkux (lit.
“early-chicken”) among chickens just
now sent me.” And Plato Comicus (the
comic playwright) says clearly in his
work, “Crying (kokkuzon) at you, the
chicken calls you forth.”39
This substantial fragment provides important insight into the lexical work of
Aristophanes. Unlike Philitas who seems to have paid careful attention to words
mainly for use in his own poetry, Aristophanes, the evidence suggests, examined
words for their own sake. Furthermore, while Philitas was fascinated with obscure and
unconventional words, Aristophanes instead seeks minor insights about mundane
words, as, for instance, in another entry: “even Plato Comicus says ‘the prosopos
(“face, countenance”; masculine) has spoken,’ instead of prosopon (neuter).”40
Aristophanes seems to be commenting merely on the gender of the word which is

37
38
39
40

Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164.
Parsinus gr. 1630.
Eustathius, 1479,43 in delta 10 sine nom. auctoris.
Eustathius 1627,46 in xi 350.
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typically neuter, not masculine. While he shares with Philitas some interest in rare
words like those based on kokku-, unlike his forebear he is clearly not justifying his
use of such words in his own verse. Etymology has turned a corner.
Another notable quality of Aristophanes’ work is his citation of literary
authors by name who have been drawn from a wide range of literature. For instance,
another fragment reads, “And Aristophanes says that Sophocles says in relation to
damalis (“heifer”), ‘earth-born boubalis (“heifer”),’ and Aeschylus says, ‘a new-born
boubalis, eaten by a lion.’”41 This is not to say, however, that every fragment contains
a citation of authorship. In some cases, what survives is more general: “The
tragedians use prospolos (“servant”) for both men and women.”42 In others, all that
exists is a brief reference to an author without even the citation of the work from
which the word comes, as in this entry preserved by Eustathius: “The ancients clearly
indicate that an agreed upon wage was called a latron (“payment”). For this reason, as
is attested in the works of the grammarian Aristophanes, the one hired is called a
latris (“hired servant”). But otherwise, he says, it has been used to refer to slaves.”43
Despite the incomplete survival of his work, Aristophanes’ general practice as
a lexicographer is easy to reconstruct. He relied upon the texts of his literary
predecessors to validate his interpretations, often suggesting etymological connections
between words which he saw as being related. In other words, he seems to have
assessed the source texts he used without judging their correct use of Greek. In fact,
of the fragments which contain clear citations of classical authors, the majority come
from the canon newly formulated by Alexandrian scholars: Pindar, Euripides,

41
42
43

Sophocles fr. 792 R., Aeschylus fr. 330 N. 2; Slater, p. 54.
Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164.
Eustathius 1246, 9 in phi 450 in marg.
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Aristophanes Comicus, Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Homer, to name but a few.44 While
these poets were to become the bedrock on which much ancient lexical scholarship
rested, not everyone believed in the firmness of that foundation. Some looked to a
higher authority for guidance about determining the nature of the Greek language.

3. Didymus Chalcenterus (ca. 63 BCE – 10 CE)
Born a century or so after the death of Aristophanes of Byzantium, Didymus
Chalcenterus (“Bronze-Guts”) was an Alexandrian scholar known for his prolific
publication record. According to Quintilian, he wrote such a large number of texts on
so many topics that, “when he opposed someone’s argument on the grounds that it
was false, a book of his own which contained the same argument was brought
forward.”45 Despite this brazen corpus, his work, like that of Aristophanes and
Philitas, survives predominantly in fragments, found across a wide array of sources
such as scholia for the Iliad and quotations preserved in Athenaeus, Eustathius, and
Hesychius. More broadly, however, Didymus is representative of some of the ways in
which lexicographical questions had influence across the various writings of
Alexandrian scholars.
For instance, one fragment attributed to Didymus reads, “… written with an
omicron and an upsilon pou, instead of pō (omega). Such are the opinions of
Sosigenes and Aristophanes.”46 This is a reference to Iliad which reads “We know not
anything at all (pou) about a common store of wealth.”47 There is obviously some

44

Although we now know that Homer greatly predates these authors, ancient scholars included
Homer alongside them.
45
Quintilian, 1.9.19.
46
A.124; Didymus Chalcenterus and Moritz Schmidt, Didymi Chalcenteri grammatici
Alexandrini fragmenta quae supersun omnia (Amersterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1964), 117.
47
Il. 1.124: οὐδέ τί που ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά.
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question about the reading of this line: should it read pou or pō? Since both words are
metrically identical, the resolution of the matter falls to questions about the
manuscripts and the meanings of the words.
When written with an omega, this word is generally taken as the question
word for “where” in the Doric dialect. Other uses include its function in compounds,
for instance, oupō (“never”), and in questions which expect a negative answer. Here,
however, Didymus’ concern seems to center around which reading makes better sense
in the context. It is certainly plausible that there is also a question of transcription,
since one can see how an omega and an omicron-upsilon pair could be confused for
one another in a handwritten document, yet the invocation of scholarly opinion,
particularly that of Aristophanes, as the deciding authority argues otherwise.
Didymus’ reliance on preceding scholarship as to the proper interpretation of the text
offers an important glimpse into the intellectual workings of Alexandria. How prior
scholars saw the text affected the way later scholars thought about its correctness.
Here, Didymus is choosing to defer to the opinions of earlier scholars since he thinks
that they are more correct.
Another scholium, this one on Iliad 10.431, is quite succinct, “hippodamoi:
Aristarchus reads hippomachoi.”48 Modern editions of the Iliad prefer to read
hippomachoi, so the full line reads “…and the Phrygians, fighters on horseback
(hippomachoi), and the Maeonians, arrangers of chariots”.49 It is difficult to believe
that the change between hippodamoi and hippomachoi was the result of manuscript
error. Instead, it seems more plausible to suggest that this variation in reading is the
result of a question over which Greek base is appropriate given the context of the

48
49

K.431; Schmidt, Fragmenta, 141.
Il. 10.431: καὶ Φρύγες ἱππόμαχοι καὶ Μῄονες ἱπποκορυσταί.
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word, dam- (“conquer”) or mach- (“fight”). That is, should the reader have the sense
that the Phrygians are known for their ability to tame horses, or for fighting
predominantly on horseback? Although this is the type of question which
lexicography could answer, Didymus’ attitude indicates that the fact that Aristarchus
reads the line one way means it is the correct way. There is a certain prescriptive
deference; what older scholars said was more correct and preferable.
Similarly, a scholion on Iliad 1.298 reads, “machēsomai: written so with an eta
machēsomai, not with an epsilon-sigma machessomai,…”50. The full line reads “I will
not fight (machēsomai) with my hands for the sake of the girl;” the question addressed
in the scholium is over the future form of the verb machomai (“fight”).51 This is a
much more difficult issue to explain by manuscript error alone since there is no clear
explanation for the conflation of an eta and an epsilon sigma. A form of machomai
featuring the stem machess- is not without precedent in Homer since there are attested
certain forms of the aorist like this, for instance, machessasthai at Iliad 12.633;
however, there is no such precedent for a future tense which uses that stem. Although
the two forms are again metrically identical, the question centers on the “correct”
formation of the future tense. In this way, the scholia of Didymus show that there was
a certain connection between textual problems and issues of proper language within
Alexandrian scholarship. The readings suggested by older scholars like Aristophanes
of Byzantium had authority for that reason and were preferred. Ideas about
correctness had to do with the opinions of one’s predecessors and what they wrote
about a matter.

50
51

A.298; Schmidt, Fragmenta, 118.
Il. 12.633: χερσὶ μὲν οὔ τοι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα κούρης.
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In conclusion, over a three-hundred year span, Greek lexicography changed
considerably. From Philitas’ creation of a glossary to explain his peculiar vocabulary
to Aristophanes’ eventual formalization of the process to Didymus’ invocation of
lexical authorities in textual criticism, it took on the attributes of a more scientific
process and became an important facet of intellectual endeavor. Although Didymus
abided by the opinions of his predecessors and maintained their tendencies, change
was on the horizon in the person of someone would challenge the conventions of that
Alexandrian tradition.
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CHAPTER 2: Herennius Philo

Having now covered the early history of lexicography, we come to the primary
item of interest in this thesis, Herennius Philo’s De Diversis Verborum
Significationibus. In stark contrast to the previous lexicographers, whose interests
were predominantly descriptive in some form or other, Philo takes a decidedly
prescriptive interest by making assertions as to correct usage of words. To understand
this change, it’s necessary to see the man in his proper historical context.

1. Philo’s Life
The available biographical information on Philo’s life comes from the Suda, a
tenth-century Byzantine lexicon and encyclopedia of the ancient world, which tells us
that, “[Philo] was born around the time of Nero (54-68 CE), and lived for a long time;
he himself says, when he was seventy-eight years old, the serving consul was
Herennius Severus in Olympiad 220 (101-104 CE).” Because there was no consul
named Herennius Severus in 101-104 BCE, the evidence here is suspect. Moreover,
as Nikos Kokkinos among others points out, to be age seventy-eight in 101-104 CE,
Philo could not have possibly been born in the reign of Nero. 52 Kokkinos then argues
that the date should be emended to Olympiad 230 (141-144 CE) where there was, in
fact, a T. Hoenius Severus who served as consul (141 CE), and whose name,
Kokkinos argues, was assimilated to “Herennius” because Hoenius is an uncommon
name. This argument is made all the more plausible by the broader association of

Nikos Kokkinos, “A note on the date of Philo of Byblus.” Classical Quarterly N.S. 62, no. 1
(2012): 433-435. Doi: 10.1017/S000983881100053X
52
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Philo with his patron, one Herennius Severus, who is mentioned in the writings of
Pliny the Younger.
Consequently, it seems more reasonable to assume that Philo was indeed born
in or around 64 CE, and, if he did in fact live “for a long time,” perhaps into his mid80s, he died sometime around 148 CE.53 Other scholars have offered different theories
for correcting the content of the Suda, but they all conclude that Philo was born in the
second half of the first century and lived well into the second.54
Among other data about his life, we know that Philo produced numerous
works besides De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, including Concerning the
Reign of Hadrian, On Cities and their Famous Men, On the Acquisition and Choice of
Books, and a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.55

2. Philo’s De Diversis Verborum Significationibus
The history of this text is complex. As best we understand it, at some point
around the beginning of the second century CE, Philo wrote a lexicon comparing
different words. It was entitled Peri Diaphorous Semasias (“On Differences of
Meaning”). This text is now lost. What survives is quoted in two different sources: the
writings of Ammonius Grammaticus and those of a mysterious figure named
“Ptolemaeus.” From Ammonius Grammaticus in the fourth century, we have two
separate works: first, the one in question, De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, an

53

We know that Philo authored a work titled Concerning the Reign of Hadrian, which suggests
that he likely lived beyond 138 CE, the year of Hadrian’s death.
54
Vincenzo Palmieri proposes that the Olympiad should be read as Olympiad 226, though this
would make Philo well over ninety years old when he could have written his biography of Hadrian,
which makes the timeline implausible. Albert Baumgarten also refers to the possibility of reading eis
makron (for a long time) as eis Markon (into the reign of Marcus Aurelius), however this is also
implausible.
55
Harold Attridge and Robert Oden, Philo of Byblos: The Phoenician History (Washington DC:
The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1981) p. 2
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epitome of Philo’s original lexicon, and second, Ammonius’ own work, De Adfinium
Vocabulorum Differentia (“On the Differences of Similar Words”), which borrows
heavily from Philo’s original, but with crucial differences in readings. Lastly, the
lexicon attributed to “Ptolemaeus” is of uncertain date. Although its contents are
similar to those of the epitome, they have been substantially pared down to the point
that it pales in comparison to either of the works from Ammonius and has no real
bearing on the text of Philo or this thesis.56
The critical point here is that what survives of Herennius Philo is seen
primarily through the lens of Ammonius Grammaticus. As such, the window into
Philo’s lexicon is limited; however, examination of the epitome alongside the text of
Ammonius’ own work nevertheless reveals critical details about Philo’s attitude
toward his discipline.
Palmieri’s critical edition of the text (1988) spans 1125 lines and 180 entries,
running from alpha through phi. The table below shows the alphabetic distribution of
the entries in the text:

56

Although it is not attributed to Philo by name, the similarity of its content indicates that it also
used Philo’s archetype. There is, however, no known scholar of the name “Ptolemaeus” who could
have authored this document, nor is this lexicon any more informative about the study of Philo than
either of Ammonius’ works. It is not known when the first version of Ptolemaeus’ lexicon was written,
but scholars agree, according to Dickey, that it was written after Ammonius Grammaticus. None of
Ptolemaeus’ entries contain citations, and many are simply summaries of entries from the works of
Ammonius. Consequently, the lexicon of Ptolemaeus does not have immediate bearing in discerning
Philo’s objectives or approach to lexicography.
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Letter

# of Entries

Alpha

36

Beta

3

Gamma

4

Delta

10

Epsilon

29

Zeta

2

Eta

4

Theta

8

Iota

5

Kappa

11 (6*)

Lambda

1 (5*)57

Mu

7

Nu

5

Xi

1

Omicron

13

Pi

18

Rho

3

Sigma

9

Tau

8

Upsilon

2

Phi

1

Table 1: Distribution of Entries by Initial Letter

It is important also to note that this distribution closely reflects the distribution of
words in the Greek language itself. The following table shows that the number of
entries per section in Philo’s text roughly corresponds to the proportion of pages spent
on any given letter in the LSJ.

57

Due to what appears to be an issue with the manuscript, a number of entries beginning with
lambda occur in the kappa section, prior to the heading which marks the beginning of the lambdas.
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Letter

LSJ (pages/total)

Philo (entries/total)

Alpha

0.15

0.2

Beta

0.015

0.016

Gamma

0.015

0.02

Delta

0.05

0.05

Epsilon

0.045

0.161

Zeta

0.0045

0.01

Eta

0.01

0.022

Theta

0.015

0.044

Iota

0.015

0.027

Kappa

0.09

0.033

Lambda

0.025

0.0277

Mu

0.045

0.038

Nu

0.0125

0.0277

Xi

0.003

0.005

Omicron

0.045

0.072

Pi

0.14

0.1

Rho

0.0075

0.016

Sigma

0.085

0.05

Tau

0.045

0.044

Upsilon

0.035

0.011

Phi

0.025

0.005

Chi

0.03

N/A

Psi

0.006

N/A

Omega

0.0065

N/A

Standard Deviation

0.040

0.050

Table 2: Comparison of the Distribution of Words in the LSJ vs. Philo

The distribution of words in the Greek language compared to Philo’s range proves
that he is looking broadly across the Greek vocabulary, which suggests that Philo is
addressing words more or less randomly. Equally important, this implies that his
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epitomator, Ammonius Grammaticus, is consulting a complete text of Philo, not
selections based on the alphabet. As to the content of the work, it is clear that Philo is
principally interested in distinguishing three “classes” of similar words: (1) one class
that is based on meaning (false synonyms), (2) one class of words that look alike
because of spelling and accentuation (homographs and near homographs), and (3) one
class of words which share a common root or base but behave differently
(grammatical variants).58
Entry 15 is an example of the first class. It explains the distinction between
two verbs (referenced as infinitives) which relate to fear:
Arrodein and orrodein are opposites of
one another. For orrodein, written with
an omicron, indicates “one who acts
cautiously;”…. [For example,] Euripides
introduces Perseus, saying “For I have
never done wrong against those who
have suffered terrible things, I myself
fearing (orrodon) that I would suffer
them.”... But arrodein is the opposite,
this is not “to be cautious,” but “to aim at
and to have taken courage.”59
This example is typical of Philo. The entry begins with a clear statement of the words
in question and proceeds to explain what one means as opposed to the other, often
including some form of literary or scholarly reference, in this case, a quote from
Euripides’ lost work Andromeda. Philo’s analysis of this first class of synonyms has
the objective of clarifying the difference in meaning between two words.

58

See Appendix A for the complete translation of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus
ἀρρωδεῖν καὶ ὀρρωδεῖν ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρρωδεῖν διὰ τοῦ ο σημαίνει τὸ
εὐλαβεῖσθαι·…καὶ Εὐριπίδης τὸν Περσέα εἰσάγει λέγοντα (Andromed. fr. 130 n.2)· ‘τὰς γὰρ
συμφορὰς τῶν κακῶς πεπραγότων οὐπώποθ’ ὕβρισ’, αὐτὸς ὀρρωδῶν παθεῖν’. καὶ τὸ [μὲν] ὀρρωδεῖν
τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ ἀρρωδεῖν <τὸ ἐναντίον>, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν οὐκ εὐλαβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖν καὶ
τεθαρρηκέναι.
59
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The second class of distinct words, those with similar spellings, falls into two
types: homographs and near homographs. Entry 6 is a useful example of the latter:
An anathēma differs from an
anathĕma. For an anathēma, written
with an eta, is “a thing both
consecrated and set up in some divine
place;” but an anathĕma, written with
an epsilon, is “a thing having outrage
and a curse.”60
In this entry, the two words being compared vary by only one letter, but they have a
significant difference in meaning. The first (anathēma) is a sort of votive offering,
whereas the second (anathĕma) is something akin to a cursed amulet. This small
distinction, however, would have posed a significant problem to Greek speakers in
Philo’s day since Koine was in the process of losing distinctions in vowel
gradations.61
Similarly, Philo also takes note of true homographs, words which are spelled
the same way except for accent. Entry 7 reads:
An ágroikos with a recessive accent
and an agroîkos with a circumflex
differ. For ágroikos with a recessive
accent is “one without a share of
knowledge;” agroîkos with a
circumflex is “one passing his time in
the field or an untamed man, equal to a
wild beast.”62

ἀνάθημα ἀναθέματος διαφέρει. ἀνάθημα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ η γραφόμενον, τὸ
ἀνιερούμενόν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέμενον ἱερῷ τινι τόπῳ· ἀνάθεμα δέ, διὰ τοῦ ε ἐκφερόμενον, τὸ ὕβρεως
ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀναθεματισμοῦ.
61
See Geoffrey Horrocks’ Greek: A History of the Language and its Speakers (Wiley-Blackwell,
2010) for further details on linguistic changes in Koine. He goes on to discuss also how diacritical
marks were being developed during Philo’s age to compensate for an increasing loss of tonal
distinctions in spoken Greek.
62
ἄγροικος βαρυτόνως καὶ ἀγροῖκος προπερισπωμένως διαφέρει. ἄγροικος μὲν βαρυτόνως ὁ
γνώσεως ἄμοιρος· ἀγροῖκος δὲ προπερισπωμένως ὁ ἐν ἀργῷ διατρίβων <ἢ> ὁ μὴ ἥμερος, ἴσος τῷ
ἄγριος.
60
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Although these two words differ only in their intonation, they mean different things.
In this case, the first is most likely a reference to a stock character in Greek comedy,
whereas the second is a generic term for a farmer or any person deemed uncivilized.
In a third class of distinctions, Philo explores grammatical variations of words,
such as those between active and medio-passive forms of the same verb. For instance,
entry 17 reads:
Amunesthai and amunein differ. For
amunesthai is “to punish those who
have done wrong,” whereas amunein is
“to come to the aid of others.”63
Both of these are infinitives formed from the same verb, yet a simple change of voice
affects the meaning dramatically.
While only one of the four examples noted above (arrodein/orrodein, entry
15) contains a citation drawn from the text of a classical author, this cannot be taken
as any indication of Philo’s typical practice. Although they are not evenly distributed
and quite a few entries have none, 128 include citations to a source. Philo sometimes
embeds several citations within the same entry, and while he demonstrates a
preference for citing classical authors, he also references a variety of Alexandrian
scholars. Homer, for instance, is cited most often, thirty-three times, but the
grammarian Tryphon is mentioned ten times, and Didymus Chalcenterus six.
This marks the first of a number of differences between Philo and earlier
lexical authors. Although Philo does not fail to reference poets and playwrights such
as Menander, his principal focus is fundamentally different from that of Philitas since
there is no clear evidence that Philo is expecting his own lexical resource to serve as a

ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ ἀμύνειν διαφέρει. ἀμύνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] κολάζειν τοὺς προαδικήσαντας,
ἀμύνειν δὲ βοηθεῖν.
63
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supplement to other work he is doing. Furthermore, unlike Didymus, Philo shows no
interest in expanding scholarly debate about the meanings of words since only five
entries reference lexical disputes. If any, Aristophanes of Byzantium provides the
clearest model for Philo, inasmuch as both share the goal of clarifying the exact
meanings of words. Even so, Philo departs from all his known predecessors in one
particular aspect: his commentary on correct usage.

3. Philo’s Sources
There are sixteen instances in which Philo makes an explicit statement as to
correct or incorrect usage, for instance, entry 14:
Aûthis and aûthi without the sigma
differ; for aûthis is “again” or “after
these events,” but aûthi is also “the
very thing here”. And so Callimachus
says wrongly, “Right here (aûthi) I
would strip this off, my weight,”
instead of “after these events.” And in
the Hecale, “For this, father, release
me, and you would receive safety right
here (aûthi),” instead of “again”
(palin).64
This criticism of Callimachus’ usage of authi is striking in light of previous lexical
authors, none of whom take a vested interest in the actual usage of words in their
context; rather, they use that context to elucidate the meanings of words.65 Philo, to
the contrary, is not arguing that the text of Callimachus is wrong, but that Callimachus
himself was wrong to have violated a rule of proper word usage. While that author

αὖθις καὶ αὖθι χωρὶς τοῦ σ διαφέρει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖθις πάλιν ἢ μετὰ ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ αὖθι καὶ τὸ
αὐτόθι. κακῶς οὖν Καλλίμαχός φησιν (fr. 1, 35 Pf.)· ‘αὖθι τόδ’ ἐκδύοιμι, τό μοι βάρος’, ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ
ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑκάλῃ (fr. 238, 4 Pf.)· ‘τῷ <ῥα>, πᾶτερ, μεθίει με, σόον δέ κεν αὖθι δέχοιο’, ἀντὶ τοῦ
πάλιν.
65
While one may argue that Didymus made a number of prescriptive comments, those pertain to
the creation of authoritative texts, not the actual usage of the words.
64
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overall receives more admonition than the rest, Philo does not hesitate to critique
others: Sophocles, Menander, Euripides, Sappho, and even Homer in one instance,
although he immediately provides a justification for Homer’s solecism.66
This attitude colors the rest of the text, although the critique can be subtextual.
Sometimes the objects of Philo’s criticism are vaguer, such as in entry 157, where he
corrects “the rhetoricians”:
Pus, pei, po, and touto differ among the
Dorians. For pus is clearly an indicator
of “toward a place,” pei indicates “in a
place,” and po indicates “from a place,”
as does touto. Consequently, those who
doricise and say, “where (pei) are you
going?” do so incorrectly, because pei
indicates “in a place.” Sophron says,
“for where (pei) is the asphalt?” and,
“where (pei) are you, destruction?”
instead of “where (pou) are you?”
Whenever one intends to say “toward a
place,” they say, for instance, “where
(pus) are you going, into that corner?”
as if to mean, “into the abyss.”67
It is not clear precisely whom Philo is criticising, but this is obviously directed
towards anyone at any time attempting to reproduce classical Doric Greek which to
Philo is clearly substandard.
Elsewhere, Philo’s admonitions are directed broadly toward all those who
speak Greek:
18. Ateles and ateleston differ. For
ateles is “something which has never
been completed,” but ateleston is
“something not able to be finished.”
66

Entries 108 and 164.
πῦς καὶ πεῖ καὶ πῶ καὶ τουτῶ διαφέρει παρὰ Δωριεῦσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦς τὴν εἰς τόπον
σημασίαν δηλοῖ· τὸ δὲ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ· τὸ δὲ πῶ τὴν ἐκ τόπου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τουτῶ (cf. Sophron. fr.
85 K.). ὥσθ’ οἱ δωρίζοντες καὶ λέγοντες «πεῖ πορεύῃ;» ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τὸ γὰρ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ δηλοῖ.
Σώφρων (fr. 5 K.)· ‘πεῖ γὰρ <ἁ> ἄσφαλτος;’. (fr. 5 K.)· ‘πεῖ ἐσσί, λειοκόνιτε; —οὕτα’, ἀντὶ τοῦ «ποῦ
εἶ;». ὅταν δὲ εἰς τόπον θέλῃ εἰπεῖν, φησίν (fr. 75 K.)· ‘πῦς εἰς μυχὸν καταδύῃ;’ τουτέστιν «εἰς τὴν
ἄβυσσον».
67
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And so those who conflate these speak
incorrectly.68
It is in light of these sorts of reprimands that the purpose of Philo’s work comes into
clearer focus. Even though many of the entries are simply restatements of the
definitions of words cited in pairs, seen in their larger context they predicate the
proper use of Greek per Philo’s injunctions.
Of the 180 entries, 85 of them rely on the meaning of the words alone in order
to differentiate them. Eighty, however, refer to literary or scholarly precedent in order
to establish their difference, for instance:
122. Nees (“transport ships”) differ
from ploia (“barges”). Didymus says as
such in his History that nees differ from
ploia. For nees are rounded and used to
transport troops. Aristotle says in his
Justification of Wars, “During that time,
after the Tarentines had been sent down
to the war against the barbarians,
Alexander the Molossian sailed away
with fifteen nees, and many ploia
carrying horses and infantry.”69
Based on this passage, not only should one understand that they are different words
but also that a naus is a different type of vessel from a ploion. Since classical authors,
in this case Aristotle, use these terms interchangeably, and even if the Greek speakers
around Philo’s time conflated them, it is obvious that Philo believes people still ought
to respect the difference between the two words and what they mean. More than that,
he clearly understands them as different not just because of any variation in the ships’

ἀτελὲς καὶ ἀτέλε<σ>τον διαφέρει. ἀτελὲς μὲν γ[ὰρ] τὸ μήπω τετελεσμένον, ἀτέλεστον δὲ τὸ
ἀδύνατον τελεσθῆναι. οἱ οὖν ἐναλλάσσοντες ταῦτα ἀ[κυ]ρολογοῦσιν.
69
νῆες τῶν πλοίων διαφέρει. Δίδυμος (p. 321 Schmidt) ἐν Ἱστορικῷ φησιν οὕτως· ὅτι
διαφέρουσιν αἱ νῆες τῶν πλοίων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ν̣η̣=ε̣/ς̣ εἰσι στρογγύλαι, αἱ δὲ στρατιώτιδες. Ἀριστοτέλης
(fr. 614 R.) δέ φησιν ἐν τοῖς Δικαιώμασι τῶν πόλεων οὕτως· ‘ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ
Μολοττός, αὐτὸν καταπεμψαμένων Ταραντίνων ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πόλεμον, ἐξέπλευσε
ναυσὶ μὲν πεντεκαίδεκα, πλοίοις δὲ συχνοῖς ἱππαγωγοῖς καὶ στρατιωτικοῖς’.
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construction or use at sea, but because the Greek language has two different words for
them. Different words means they must refer to different things.
Similarly, Philo pays attention to accentuation itself and often explains it by
analogy:
140. Póneron, as in sóloikon, and
ponerón, as in noserón, are said to
differ, just like móchtheros and
mochtherós. For wickedness is ponerós
with an oxytone, but a labour is
póneros with a baritone accent. This is
because the word demands wisely from
necessity to be pronounced with an
oxytone. For everything formed by
adding the ending -ros has an oxytonic
accent, such as kámatos, kamaterós;
ólisthos, olistherós; méli, meliterós.
And if pónos and móchthos are the
originals, then ponerós and mochtherós
should be oxytonic. If Attic speakers
pronounce it with a baritone, it is not
surprising, for they rejoice in the
baritone. And so they say adelphéon;
so they preserve some habit, and they
display it.70
Although once again there is no explicit admonition as to correct usage, one cannot
help but read the grammatical explanation as a suggestion that one ought to follow
these established rules of accentuation according to word formation and avoid the
Attic variation.
This prescriptive element in Philo creates a stark contrast to the previous
lexical authors. From what we have of Philitas’ Ataktoi Glossai, there is no evidence

πόνηρον, ὡς σόλοικον, καὶ πονηρόν, ὡς νοσερόν, διαφέρειν φασίν· ὁμοίως <μόχθηρος> καὶ
μοχθηρός. πονηρὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὀξυτόν[ως] ὁ κακοήθης, βαρυτόνως δὲ ὁ ἐπίπονος· ὅτι δὲ ὀξυτονεῖν
ὁ λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης σαφές. πᾶν γὰρ παρώνυμον εἰς ρος λῆγον σχηματιζόμενον τοῖς γένεσιν
ὀξύτονόν ἐστιν, οἷον κάματος καματηρός, ὄλισθος ὀλισθηρός, μέλι μελιτηρός. εἰ καὶ πόνος καὶ μόχθος
τὰ πρωτότυπα, πονηρὸς καὶ μοχθηρὸς ὀξυτόνως. εἰ δ’ Ἀττικοὶ βαρυτονοῦσιν, οὐ θαυμαστόν· χαίρουσι
γὰρ τῇ βαρύτητι. ἀδελφέον οὖν λέγουσιν· ὡς ἔθος οὖν τι τηροῦντες, οὕτω προηνέγκαντο.
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that he was concerned with correct usage. In fact, he appears to have been a proponent
of non-standard language in general. Conversely, Philo tells us:
12. Agein and pherein differ; for
inspirited things are led (agein), but
things without spirit are borne (pherein).
And according to Homer, “here there is
not such of mine, as the Achaeans would
either bear (pheroien) or lead (agoien)
away.” And again “They were leading
the sheep, and brought glorious wine.”71
Clearly, Homer felt there was a distinction between these words. Philitas, however, is
notable for using ago in reference to an inanimate object.72 Here we have an
interesting glimpse into the scholarly backdrop against which Philo was writing.
Given some familiarity with the canon of post-classical authors who wrote lexica, it is
plausible to suppose that he knew about Philitas, and perhaps a treatise on Philitas by
Aristarchus. After consulting these sources, Philo then made a determination as to
what was the correct usage of these terms. In the end, he chose to side with Homer
and Aristarchus. Not only does this highlight key differences between Philitas and
Philo, but also the evolving methodological differences between Philo and previous
lexicographers.
Recalling the earlier discussion, we noted that Aristophanes’ aim was to
provide clear and cogent explanations of words, both rare and common. His
justifications for the definitions appear based primarily on classical literature, and at
least as far as the fragments of the Lexeis show, he does not explore the idea of proper
usage or even textual emendation. While Philo also cites classical authors, his

ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν διαφέρει. ἄγεται μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔμψυχα· φέρεται δὲ τὰ ἄψυχα. καὶ Ὅμηρος (Il. v
483 sq.)· ‘οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον, οἷον <κ’ ἠὲ> φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἤ κεν ἄγοιεν’.
καὶ πάλιν (od. iv 622)· ‘οἱ δ’ ἦγον μὲν μῆλα, φέρον δ’ εὐήνορα οἶνον’.
72
Spanoudakis, 197-8, speculates that this type of usage was one of the topics on which
Aristarchus commented in his work Against Philitas.
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references are used to present both good and bad examples, albeit more often the
latter than the former. This raises an important question: if even the original authors
can be wrong about the correct usage of words, who or what is right according to
Philo’s judgment?

4. Philo’s Method
The answer lies in the way in which Philo thought about the mechanics of
classical Greek. I propose that Philo created his distinctions according to the
following hierarchy, from most to least important: 1) form/morphology, 2) classical
usage, and 3) scholarly assessment. In other words, Philo was something of a
structural purist; by his reasoning, distinction in form, even if the difference is very
small, signals distinction in meaning. To him, this factor outweighs all others. One
can only imagine how heretical he would have deemed a thesaurus.
This viewpoint clarifies the difference in some of Philo’s entries. The final one
of the alpha section bears this out:
36. Âthlos masculine and âthlon neuter
differ. For the masculine indicates the
contest, but the neuter indicates the
prize. Homer says, “Indeed this
awesome contest (aethlos) has come to
an end,” and about the prizes, “After
taking your prizes (aethlia),…”73
Grammatically, these words come from the same root and differ only in their gender.
Even their meanings are similar, but to Philo, because they differ in their gender, they
are distinct, and therefore they must mean different things. Otherwise, why would the
distinction exist?
ἆθλος ἀρσενικῶς καὶ ἆθλον οὐδετέρως διαφέρει. ἀρσενικῶς μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀγῶνα δηλοῖ,
οὐδετέρως δὲ τὸ ἔπαθλον·Ὅμ̣[ηρ]ος ‘ο[ὗτο]ς μὲν δὴ ἄεθλος ἀάατος ἐκτε<τέ>λεσται’ (Od. xxii 5), ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν ἐπάθλων· ‘ἀέθλια ἐπαγαγόντες’ (Il. xxii 736).
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A further example of this type of entry comes in the epsilon section where a
small distinction in usage creates a substantive difference in meaning:
81. Euthus, euthu, and eutheos differ.
For a straight rod is “euthus,” euthu to
the gym is what you say, instead of
“the gym down the straight” or “with a
straight rod;” eutheos is used in place
of an adverb of time. And so he is
wrong who conflates these, as
evidenced by Menander in the
Dyskolos, “What do you mean? Did
you go straight (euthus) there, knowing
and asking for a freed slave?” … [And
Aristophanes] says about the word, “It
is necessary to use euthu for something
straight, for instance, if it is a feminine
noun, ‘the straight stick,’ or a
masculine one, ‘the straight rod,’ and
even if it is one we call neuter, ‘the
straight post.’ The ancients also
sometimes use euthu about a road
heading into some place,…74
Clearly, the guiding force behind Philo’s thinking is the fact that one of these is an
adjective (euthus), while the other two are adverbs (euthu and eutheos). His criticism
of Menander, then, is guided by the fact that the playwright uses an adjectival form
where he ought instead to use an adverbial one. To Menander this was apparently a
negligible difference, but not to Philo. Moreover, the invocation of Aristophanes to
say that “it is necessary” to use a word in a certain way offers insight into the sort of
tradition influencing Philo’s thinking. In contrast to Didymus who deferred to his

εὐθύς, εὐθὺ καὶ εὐθέως διαφέρει. εὐθὺς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κανών· εὐθὺ δὲ το<ῦ> γυμνασίου,
ἀντὶ τοῦ κατ’ εὐθείαν τοῦ γυμνασίου ἢ εὐθεῖ τῷ κανόνι· τὸ δὲ εὐθέως ἀντὶ χρονικοῦ ἐπιρρήματος. ὁ
οὖν ἐναλλάσσων ἁμαρτάνει, καθὰ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Δυσκόλῳ (50.52) ‘τί φῄς; ἰδὼν ἐνταῦθα παῖδ’
ἐλευθέραν ἐρῶν ἀπῆλθες <εὐθύς>;’ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης … φησὶ γοῦν κατὰ λέξιν· ‘δεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺ
λέγειν ἐπί τινος εὐθέος, οἷον, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ θῆλυ τὸ ὄνομα, «εὐθεῖα ἡ βακτηρία», ἐὰν δὲ ἄρσεν, «εὐθὺς ὁ
κανών», ἐὰν δὲ τὸ οὐδέτερον καλούμενον, «εὐθὺ τὸ ξύλον». οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ἐνίοτε τὸ εὐθὺ ἐτίθεσαν καὶ
ἐπὶ ὁδοῦ τῆς οὔσης ἐπί τινα τόπον…
74

35
predecessors when determining correctness, Philo invokes them to demonstrate
Menander’s incorrectness.
This focus on differentiation between words from the same root shows up
again in entry 89:
Theoros and theates differ. For a
theoros is “one sent to the gods,” a
theates is ‘a member of the audience”
and “one of the spectators.” Euripides
says in the Ion, “As a spectator
(theates) or to seek an answer from
the oracle?”75 which is to say a
theoros… Those who say, “I must
watch (theoresai) the contest,” are
incorrect; it is proper to say
“theasasthai...” And theasasthai, just
as noted above, is used in reference to
a spectacle. Theorein, they say, is
nothing other than “to reflect upon.”
And for this reason, not only those
who are not sent for the sake of
sacrifices, but also for the sake of
communal offerings and worship, all
of those are called theoroi. And a
theoric payment is given to the
Athenians not because of the
spectacles, as Caecilius supposes, but
because it was given during festivals
for the sake of showing honour to the
gods, making offerings, and
experiencing delight.76
There is no doubt that both theoros and theates come from the same root the-, but
because the verbs on which they are based, theasasthai and theorein, have different
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Euripides, Ion, 301
θεωρὸς καὶ θεατὴς διαφέρει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς θεοὺς πεμπόμενος, θεωρός, θεατὴς δὲ ἀγώνων καὶ
θεάτρων. Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἴωνι (301) ‘πότερον θεατὴς ἢ χάριν μαντευμάτων’,τουτέστι θεωρός…
ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ λέγοντες «θεωρῆσαί με δεῖ τὸν ἀγῶνα», δέον εἰπεῖν «θεάσασθαι»… καὶ ἔστι τὸ
θεάσασθαι, ὥσπερ πρόκειται, παρὰ τὴν θέαν· τὸ θεωρεῖν, φησίν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ φροντίζειν. διὸ καὶ
τοὺς οὐχὶ θυμάτων ἕνεκα πεμπομένους, τοῦ δὲ συνθῦσαι χάριν καὶ εὐσεβεῖν, πάντες ὀνομάζουσι
<θεωρούς>· καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διδόμενον θεωρικὸν οὐ διὰ τὰς θέας, ὡς Κεκίλιος ὑπέλαβεν,
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς δίδοσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβεῖν καὶ ἐπιθύειν καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι.
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meanings, so too should the nouns derived from them, according to Philo. Small
differences amount to important distinctions.
To return to an entry discussed above, when Philo comments on Homer’s
usage, he says:
164. Stratopedon differs from stratos.
For they say that the stratopedon is
“the place in which the stratos resides,”
like a camp for the stratos (“army”);
the stratos is “the number of those
serving as soldiers.”… Homer
conflates the place with the stratos,
saying, “For the paths to the stratos are
many”77 and perhaps in Attic fashion
he calls the place in which the stratos
resides the stratos, just as it is used in
other instances. And so he says, “You
will find him staying among the pigs
(suessi).”78 For he says suessi to mean
in the place of the pigs, where they
stay…79
For Philo, the distinction between these two words rests on the simple fact that one
contains pedon (“ground”) and the other does not. The stratos is the army, so surely
because stratopedon contains pedon, it by definition cannot refer to the soldiers as
well and must point toward something to do with the land on which the military
resides. Similarly, one cannot use stratopedon in place of stratos because the land
where the army is camped is not the same as the army itself. It is not surprising, then,
that Philo feels the need to comment on Homer’s usage. By Philo’s reckoning, when

77

Il. X 66
Hom. Od. XIII 407
79
στρατόπεδον στρατοῦ διαφέρει. στρατόπεδον μὲν γάρ φησιν ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός ἐστιν,
οἷον στρατο<ῦ> πέδον· ὁ δὲ στρατὸς αὐτῶν τῶν στρατευομένων τὸ πλῆθος…ὁ δ’ Ὅμηρος συγχεῖ τὸν
τόπον στρατὸν λέγων (Il. x 66)· ‘πολλαὶ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατόν εἰσι κέλευθοι’ καὶ ἴσως Ἀττικῶς στρατὸν
λέγει τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις χρᾶται. φησὶ γοῦν (Hom. Od. xiii 407)· ‘δήεις τόν γε
σύεσσι παρήμενον’. σύεσσι γὰρ εἶπεν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῶν συῶν ἔνθα αὐλίζονται
78
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Homer uses the word for a military encampment to mean the army, he is making an
error.
Entry 108 reveals a similar mode of thinking:
Libanos (“frankincense tree”) and
libanotos (“frankincense”) differ. For
libanos signifies both the mountain and
the plant, a libanotos is the burnt sap
from the plant. Euripides conflates
them in the reverse order, using libanos
to describe what is burnt, as does
Sophocles in the Tereus and Sappho,
who calls a libanos libanotos.80
Of these references, only one survives in an extant work, the one from Euripides
(Bacchae 144): “And Bacchus, holding up a flame, as if from Syrian libanos...”
Despite Philo’s admonition that it is not an entire tree being burned, only its resin, it is
clear that Euripides is using the poetic license often afforded to a playwright. This
usage recalls Homer’s extension of the meaning of “camp” to “army.” To Philo,
however, this sort of freedom blurs meaning which is clearly unacceptable in his mind
because the words differ in their structure, one employing only the stem liban- and the
other libanot-, a compound of the same stem. For this reason, as far as Philo is
concerned, they are not interchangeable.81
In entry 98, there is more evidence of Philo’s attention to suffixes:
Italoi and Italiotai differ. For the
Italoi are “those who have inhabited
the land from the beginning,” but the
Italiotai are “such people of the
Greeks who inhabited the place after

λίβανος καὶ λιβανωτὸς διαφέρει. Λίβανος μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὄρος <καὶ τὸ δένδρον>, λιβανωτὸς
δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρου δάκρυον θυμιώμενον. Εὐριπίδης (Bacch. 144) συγχεῖ ἐναντίως ὡς ἐπὶ <τοῦ>
θυμιᾶν τὸ λίβανον· καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Τηρεῖ (fr. 595a Radt)· καὶ Σαπφὼ (fr. 44, 30 L.—P. = 44, 30
Voigt) ε̣)ν̣ δευτέρῳ λίβανον τὸ λιβανωτὸν λέγει.
81
In fact, the -ot- affix often has the force of a perfect participle. It is not surprising that Philo
would have understood libanotos as something which has been produced from a libanos, something
“having been liban-ed.”
80

38
these peoples.” The same is true of
both the Sikels and the Sikeliots.82
Philo, here, is making a similar kind of morphological distinction. Because the latter
word contains the -tes masculine “gentile” suffixit cannot mean the same thing as the
base adjective.83
The examples above show how Philo pays close attention the morphological
elements of words and uses them to demonstrate distinctions in meaning; however,
even when two words are morphologically the same, he also seeks to find distinctions,
such as entry 29:
Asphódelos and asphodelós differ among
the Attics according to their oxytone.
Tryphon, among others, says this in his
second work on Attic prosody. For the
one accented with a baritone is the plant
among the ancients, but the one accented
with the oxytone is the location in which
the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon
himself is somewhat inclined to write the
place with the same accentuation as the
plant. For often, he says, the
surroundings are said with the same
accent as what is being surrounded. For
we also speak of garlic heads themselves
and this has come to overlap with where
they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the
crocus plant itself and the place in which
it grows.84
Although Philo directs us to Tryphon to explain that places and products are
interchanged, the tone is negative, leaving the sense that we ought not to be treating
Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Ἰταλιῶται διαφέρει. Ἰταλοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν χώραν οἰκήσαντες,
Ἰταλιῶται <δὲ> ὅσοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπῴκησαν μετὰ ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Σικελῶν καὶ
Σικελιωτῶν.
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Herbet Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2014), 233.
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ἀσφόδελος καὶ ἀσφοδελὸς κατὰ τὸν ὀξὺν τόνον διαφέρει <παρὰ> τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· ἄλλοι τε καὶ
Τρύφων (fr. 14Vels.) ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ Ἀττικῆς προσῳδίας· τὸ βαρυτονούμενον γὰρ τὸ φυτὸν παρὰ
τοῖς παλαι̣οῖς, [ὀ]ξυτονούμενον δὲ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀσφόδελος γίνεται· αὐτὸς δέ τι ὁ Τρύφων
προκρίνει ὁμοτόνως τῷ φυτῷ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκφέρειν· πολλάκις <γάρ>, φησίν, τοῖς περιεχομένοις τὰ
περιέχοντα ὁμοτόνως λέγεται. καὶ σκόροδα γὰρ αὐτὰ λέγομεν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἔνθα συμβέβηκε ταῦτα
πιπράσκεσθαι· ὁμοίως κρόκον αὐτὸ τὸ ἄνθος καὶ τὸν τόπο[ν] ἐν ᾧ φύε̣ται.
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these words as interchangeable, because even when the distinction comes down to
accent alone, the meanings of the words should be different merely on account of
their form. Thus, the structure of words appears to be the highest criterion for Philo.
In some instances, however, form and morphology are insufficient to express
the distinction. What is Philo to do when, say, two words are treated as
interchangeable but come from entirely different roots, as in entry 76?
Endon differs from eso. For endon is
“in places,” eso is “towards a place.”
For a child is inside, but I am going
outside. And so he is wrong who says,
“I am going inside (endon),” or “The
child is outside (eso).” Sophocles
confounds this difference and says in
the Trachiniai, “Women, both those in
(eso) the house, and those further
beyond.” It is proper to say, “Women,
those within (endon) the house.” And
Euripides says in the Hercules, “the old
man and old woman in (eso) the
house,” instead of endon. And
Euboulos the middle comic poet says in
the Kalathephoroi, “You will find out
in some way, it is a certain old man
inside (eso),” but it is proper to say
endon.85
Here, it was useful to Philo to look at classical authorship. Morphologically, these
words are entirely different, yet it appears to Philo they are being used incorrectly
even among classical sources. However, just following the pattern used in other
entries where the interchange of words is based on shared etymological elements
could not work here, since the problem does not lie in the appearance of the words but

ἔνδον πρὸς τὸ ἔσω διαφέρει. ἔνδον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόποις, ἔσω δὲ τὸ εἰς τόπον. ἔνδον μὲν γάρ
ἐστιν ὁ παῖς, ἔσω δὲ εἰσέρχομαι. ἁμαρτάνει γοῦν ὁ λέγων «ἔνδον εἰσέρχομαι» ἢ «ἔσω ἐστὶν ὁ παῖς».
Σοφοκλῆς τὴν δια[φο]ρὰν συγχεῖ· φησὶ γοῦν ἐν Τραχιν<ί>αις (202 sq.) ‘γυναῖκες, αἵ τ’ ἔσω στέγης αἴ
τ’ ἐκτός’, δέον εἰπεῖν «γυναῖκες, αἵ τ’ ἔνδον στέγης». καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ (cf. Heraclid. 584)
‘γέροντα τὴν δ’ ἔσω γραῖαν δόμων’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνδον. καὶ Εὔβουλος ὁ τῆς μέσης κωμῳδίας ποιητὴς
Καλαθηφόροις (fr. 40 K. = iii 224 M.) ‘ὅπως δὲ πε<ύ>σεσθ’· ἔστι τις γέρων ἔσω;’ δέον εἰπεῖν «ἔνδον».
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with a more fundamental error. To Philo, people fail to understand that “es-” should
denote “outside” and “en-” should denote “inside.” As such, Philo resorted to citing
classical authors to illustrate the incorrect usages and how to correct them.
This marks an important juncture where citations of classical authors become a
critical, back-up tool for Philo. As in entry 76, sometimes he uses these to
demonstrate errors, but at other times to underline correct usage as in entry 60:
Epikouroi (“allies”) and boethoi
(“mercenaries”) differ. For epikouroi
are “those who are allies and rally for
those under attack,” but boethoi are
“the allies of those attacking.” Homer
preserves this distinction throughout
his poetry, for the epikouroi belong to
the besieged Trojans and the boethoi
are the allies of the Greeks. And so
one cannot find in his work a named
epikouros of the Greeks, only the
Trojans.
Epikouroi and boethoi share no etymological or morphological connection, so it falls
to Homeric usage to explain how they are different.
Entry 134 shows an instance in which classical usage provides support for
reasoning based on etymology:
Orthros and proi differ. Orthros is
“the time before sunrise,” according
to which we become upright
(orthos) after standing up from
sleep, proi is the first part of the day
according to Homer, “early (proi) at
dawn,” and Hesiod says someone
died “at the dawn (of his life)
without ever marrying at all.”86

ὄρθρος καὶ πρωῒ διαφέρει. ὄρθρος μὲν ἡ πρὸ ἀνατολῆς ὥρα, καθ’ ἣν ἐξ ὕπνου ἀναστάντες
ὄρθιοι γινόμεθα, πρωῒ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καθὰ Ὅμηρος (Il. viii 530 xviii 277.303)· ‘πρωῒ δ’ ὑπηοῖοι’. καὶ
Ἡσίοδος (fr. 313 Merk.—W.) τελευτῆσαί τινά φησι ‘πρωῒ μάλ’ ἠΐθεον’.
86
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Although these words do not share an etymological connection, it is clear that Philo
connects the orth- stem in orthos and orthros with the Greek base that means
“upright.” 87 Since orthros refers to early morning, Philo concludes that this alludes to
the moment when people tend to stand upright for the first time in the day.
Classical usage is not the basis of Philo’s lexicography but in effect this
backup plan, and this helps to explain why he feels justified in criticising some
historical texts for their purported solecisms. To Philo, all words ought to be
instantiations of higher linguistic principles. Unlike traditional lexicographers who
look to usage for the rationale behind meaning, Philo treats usage and meaning as
separate phenomena that may or may not coincide, and when they do not, meaning
must prevail.
If it suits his purpose, scholarly opinion can serve as a helpful supplement to
the distinction Philo is making, as is evident in some of the entries above. At other
times, however, it is little more than a last resort to explain minute distinctions, as in
161, in which he compares “staphulé with an oxytone (“ripe”) and staphúle with a
baritone (“a plummet”).” This entry, the longest one surviving, is a grand exercise in
understanding ancient scholarly opinion on accentuation. Morphologically, there is no
distinction between these words; they differ only in accent. Since these words look all
but identical, one can only imagine the number of ancient authors who struggled, by
Philo’s understanding, to use these forms correctly. Yet because these two words
differ in accent, they should be considered distinct, since meaning must follow form.
In sum, Philo’s deep concern with the structure and form of the Greek
language as something independent of usage represents a striking departure from the
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work and attitude of previous lexicographers. For this reason, the lexicon of
Ammonius Grammaticus, whom one might call Philo’s spiritual successor, is also
worth examining. It is important to recall that Ammonius is also our best source for
the text of Philo whose original lexicon does not survive. We must never forget that
we see Philo through Ammonius’ eyes.

5. “Ammonius Grammaticus”
It is necessary first to clarify the identity of Ammonius, the epitomator of
Philo. There are four potential candidates of varying viability: (1) there was an
Ammonius of Alexandria, a pupil of Aristarchus; (2) a third-century CE Platonist
Ammonius Saccas; (3) the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius, son of Hermeias,
who lived in the sixth century CE; and (4) the fourth-century grammarian Ammonius
Grammaticus. According to Dickey, only the fourth lived at the correct time to be the
same Ammonius who epitomated Philo.88 This Ammonius fled to Constantinople
from Alexandria and is cited in Socrates Scholasticus’ Ecclesiastical History.89
In addition to his epitome of Philo, Ammonius’ other text survives intact, De
Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia (“On the Differences of Similar Words”). The 525
individual entries in Ammonius’ lexicon bear a strong similarity to Philo’s surviving
180 in that they focus on the different meanings of words, for instance, entry 30,
“Allos and heteros differ. For heteros refers to two, but allos refers to more than two.”
Often attention is given to words which look or sound alike. Entry 33, for example,
says:
Amygdalê and amygdále
(“almond”) differ. For amygdalê
88
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with a circumflex is clearly the
plant. Amygdále with an oxytone
is the nut, for which reason
Eupolis says in the Taxiarchoi,
“Give to eat the Naxian fruit
(amygdálas).”
While Ammonius’ work is very close to Philo in its approach to lexicography, there
are four significant differences.
First, there are a few entries in the epitome with variants in Ammonius’ text.
For instance, Philo’s entry 16 compares aponoia and anoia, where Ammonius’ entry
56 compares anoia and aphrosune with no mention of aponoia. Similarly, Philo
compares andragathia and andreia (30), while Ammonius compares andragathema
and andria (41). There are also entire entries in the epitome which do not correspond
to anything in Ammonius. 90
Second, there are differences in the citations between the two texts. For
instance, entry 16 in Ammonius, which corresponds to entry 20 in Philo, compares
aito and aitoumai. However, where Philo attributes a quote to Menander’s Dyskolos,
Ammonius assigns it to the same playwright’s Hymnis. In addition, entry 249 in
Ammonius shows the use of different texts. Although both authors cite and attribute
the same lines from Menander’s Hero and Sophocles’ Palamedes, Ammonius’
version includes a different line from Homer – Odyssey 2.356 as opposed to Odyssey
11.223 in Philo 97 – and omits Philo’s references to Aeschylus.
This suggests that Ammonius is making deliberate changes in Philo’s entries,
no doubt, emending, in some cases, what he sees as errors or inconsistencies. Of the
entries from Philo which correspond with Ammonius, forty-one show there has been
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some degree of alteration made in the citations, either the inclusion of new ones or the
replacement or exclusion of the ones in Philo. For instance, Philo 97 clearly contains a
corrupt quotation from Aeschylus’ Choephoroi. The text in Philo reads hemin eos
isthi (“Know our dawn”), a phrase that does not occur in the play. It is most likely a
misreading of Choephoroi 147, hemin de pompos isthi (“Be my emissary”). Philo’s
text appears to have conflated the imperative of oida (“know”) with the
orthographically identical imperative of eimi (“be”). How the error crept into Philo’s
text is not clear. It could have been in Philo’s original or the result of later
miscopying. Regardless, Ammonius saw what was a clear error and omitted it.
Third, sixty-seven of the entries exhibit some sort of substantial change in the
definition.91 Ammonius also alters and adds to Philo’s explanations. Philo 51 reads:
Diploun and diplasion, it is said,
differ. For diploun is said of things
based on their size, and diplasion
based on their number, for instance,
“twice as many (diplasia) coins.”
Diploun is said of things which are
doubled, just as about clothes being
folded, “the doubled (diploun)
cloak,” not diplasion. For diplasion
is used for the differences in size or
number other than dimension, such
as, “This is twice (diplasion) the size
of that,” and, “This city is twice
(diplasion) as far away as that one,”
not “diploun.”92
Ammonius 137, however, reorders the language and extends the explanation:
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45
Diploun and displasion differ. For
diploun is used based on size, but
diplasion is used based on number,
just as triplasion and tetraplasion.
For instance, “He has twice
(diplasia) the number of coins.”
Diploun is used of things which
have been doubled, such as folded
clothes, “a doubled-over (diploun)
cloak,” not one twice the size
(diplasion).
In contrast to Philo, Ammonius includes the fact that diplasion functions on analogy
with higher numbers, the same way we would say “triple” or “quadruple,” and trims
down Philo’s contrasting examples.
In some instances, Ammonius’ explanations offer greater clarity. Where Philo
89 says, “Theorein, they say, is nothing other than ‘to reflect upon,’...” Ammonius
226 reads, “Theorein, they say, is nothing other than to watch out for the gods, and
that is ‘to reflect upon’...” Likewise, Ammonius 362, which reads largely the same as
Philo 136, adds this comment to a quotation of Callimachus: “… which indeed is out
of place. For he should have said houneka (“because of”), so that the sense would
become, ‘not because of one song.’”
Fourth, and most importantly, Ammonius does not always retain the same
criticisms as Philo. Ammonius 301 reads, “Libanos and libanotos differ. For a libanos
is in common speech both the plant and the burnable resin, but a libanotos is only the
resin.” However, as noted above, the original citation in Philo (108) goes on to
criticize Euripides and other authors, whereas Ammonius offers no quotes or
criticisms of classical usage. Similarly, Ammonius 448 reads: “Stratopedon and
stratos differ. For the stratopedon is the place in which the army resides, but the
stratos is the number of soldiers.” In the comparable entry, we saw that Philo then
proceeds to charge Homer with committing a solecism, a criticism Ammonius omits.
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Again, compare Philo 179 and Ammonius 485:
Philo: Hyposchesis (promise)
differs from epangelias
(assurance). For one intending to
give something worthwhile
promises (hypischneitai), but one
who intends to provide
something without demand
assures (epangelletai). And so it
is necessary to take care (italics
mine).93
Ammonius: Hyposchesis and
epangelia differ. For one who
intends to give something
worthwhile “promises”
(hypischeitai), and one who
intends to provide something
without demand “assures”
(epangelletai).
The omission of Philo’s final admonition is telling. Ammonius is less prone to
censure, which is not to say that his text is entirely free of prescriptive injunctions. In
fact, of the eighteen entries in Philo which contain some form of cautionary statement,
fifteen recur in Ammonius’ text, either intact or with only minor changes. Moreover,
there are three remonstrations that occur in Ammonius with the same corrective tone
and phraseology as Philo, but which lack a counterpart in Philo’s original: 64, 413,
and 449.94
It is noteworthy, however, that the three criticisms which Philo makes and
Ammonius omits are all directed at ancient authors (Euripides, Sophocles, Sappho,
and Homer). By contrast, Ammonius’ three prescriptive entries not found in Philo are
not explicitly directed at any ancient author’s word choice. This suggests that
Ammonius is more reserved in his criticism of the ancient sources than Philo and is

ὑπόσχεσις ἐπαγγελίας διαφέρει. ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν γὰρ ὁ τὸ ἀξιωθὲν διδόναι
θέλων· ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ ὁ δίχα παρακλήσεως παρέχειν τι βουλόμενος. χρὴ οὖν παρατηρεῖν.
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opting only to include those entries with which he agrees. This offers a glimpse into
Ammonius’ larger purpose. While he is indeed following in Philo’s footsteps, at least
inasmuch as he is writing his entries according to the same prescriptive, dual-entry
contrastive formula, at the same time his tone is less severe as evidenced in his
general reluctance to accuse ancient authors of committing solecisms.
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CHAPTER 3: Lexicography after Philo

1. A Broad View of Later Greek Lexica
How are we to interpret Philo and Ammonius in the broader context of later
Greek lexicography? To this end, let us take a brief look at later lexicographical
authors, both those who immediately followed Philo and those who came much later.
The pattern that emerges is a marked decline in the chastising tone that Philo
embodies, and a rise in what is better described as simple glossaries in which ancient
sources are typically viewed as authorities on language, essentially a return to
Alexandrian standards.
First, the closest contemporary to Philo is Phrynichus Arabius who lived
during the later second century CE. His Eclogues, which survive in their entirety,
feature short statements quite clearly directed toward changing the reader’s usage of
Greek, perhaps even more directly than Philo. For instance, he says in entry 6,
“Mechris (“until”) and achris (“as far as”) with a sigma are improper. Say mechri and
achri.” Furthermore, he says in entry 8, “Never say ‘he spits (emptuei) on me,’ but ‘he
spits (kataptuei) at me,’ and ‘I spat (kateptusa) at him.’” Given his use of imperatives,
Phrynichus appears even stronger in his censure than Philo, but there is an important
distinction. While Phrynichus criticises modern solecisms and even some
conventional Attic usages, it is not clear that he ever explicitly condemned the
language of specific classical authors.95
Another author who lived after Philo but before Ammonius is Moeris, an
Atticist lexicographer from the third century. His lexicon is similar to that of
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Phrynichus in that the entries are relatively short and organized in contrasting pairs.
For instance, entry 45 under alpha says, “The Attics say arrena (“masculine”); the
Greeks say arsena (“masculine”).” Similarly, entry 7 under nu says, “The Attics say
neaton (“outermost”); eschaton (“farthest”) (is used) in common speech.” The overall
attitude of Moeris’ text seems to be descriptive. Unlike Philo and Phrynichus, his
entries are structured so as to highlight differences between uniquely Attic
expressions or words and more general Greek vocabulary. It is plausible that, as with
many entries in Philo, there is an undertone of correction. The absence of explicit
condemnations, however, reduces that possibility considerably, and we must assume
Moeris deliberately chose not to follow Philo in this practice.
Like Ammonius’, the entries of both Moeris and Phrynichus are similar to
Philo in disposition. All center around pairs of words and state how they differ in
meaning. Philo, however, stands apart from the others in that he offers more
explanation for the reasoning behind the differences he cites and a much greater
willingness to criticize ancient sources. While Phrynichus and Moeris appear more
focused on correcting the Greek of the living speakers in their time, Philo was intent
on correcting the Greek of any speaker, past or present.
Despite its popularity in the second and third century, this dual-entry
contrastive style of lexicon did not persist. Instead, in the fifth and sixth centuries, it
was replaced by simpler glossaries. By the Byzantine period these had become the
norm and are best represented by the important early medieval lexicographer
Hesychius, who lived sometime around the fifth or sixth century CE.
Much of Hesychius’ importance comes from the fact that his lexicon is the
only source for a number of obscure words and proper names, such as those of Attic
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gene (“clans”).96 The entries are structured not in paired groups but as straightforward
glosses presented in both their dictionary and inflected forms. For instance, entry 63
under alpha says, “abalis: a wretched olive tree,” and entry 22 under lambda reads,
“labreusai: to speak boisterously and incessantly (cf. labros, “lip”).” Although not as
abbreviated as Moeris’, the main distinction is that, even when Hesychius references
classical authors, his lexical entries do not exhibit or even hint at any sort of
corrective attitude.
It is important to be aware, however, that this lexicon has been “severely
abridged” and “heavily interpolated” in its transmission.97 As a result, there is a
possibility that these entries may have contained more detail, though one of the most
interpolated sources, the lexicon of Cyrillus which also contain many brief entries,
militates against that possibility.
Cyrillus’ lexicon was created around the same time as that of Hesychius, but
has a different focus. It focuses the majority of its entries on biblical terms.98
Stylistically, it closely follows Hesychius.For instance, the second entry under the
heading beta-alpha-gamma reads, “bagion: large,” and the eighth entry under
lambda-alpha-upsilon reads, “laura: a road, a single street.” Some entries contain
more detail, such as the fifth entry under theta-epsilon-omega, “theoria: the act of
perceiving sensations in the presence of those more divine. Properly, theoria is
witnessing God, inasmuch as it is possible for a human to perceive Him.” In
conjunction with Hesychius, these lexica suggest that the fifth century marks a turning
point in the general style of lexica.
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Lastly, the work of Photius, a ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople,
represents the culmination of the glossary style of lexicon. Although some of the
entries are rather long, the majority are quite short, some only one or two words in
length, and few contain citations of literary authors. For instance, entry 21 under
gamma says, “Galeos: a type of fish,” and entry 107 under delta reads, “Deile: the
part of the day after midday.” What is most important here is that even in the longer
entries there is little evidence of a corrective attitude.
This brief survey of the evolution of Greek lexica before and after Philo’s
lifetime shows that during the second century there was a shift in lexicographical
thinking toward prescriptive entries. Herennius Philo, the important figure among
these corrective lexicographers, not only cautioned his readers about their use of
words but also censured classical authors for what he saw as improper usage. But
what are we to make of the fact that, despite the efforts of Philo and others, the
corrective attitude in their lexica did not persist for long, even as the language
continued to change? Plato phrased the question this way:
Then, if I take something from
reality, for instance what we now
call a “man,” and I call this a
“horse,” and that which we now
call a “horse” a “man,” will the
name for this be “man” for the
public, but “horse” for me, and
“man” for me and “horse” for the
public?99
In other words, can language be arbitrary, or is there an essential correctness to it?
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2. Conclusion
What is it that causes someone to pay such close attention to words and
language that they feel the need to admonish perceived linguistic lapses even in past
speakers? Indeed, what is it that motivates a person to codify and refine linguistic
rules, even when meaning and understanding are not impeded? The preface to Samuel
Johnson’s 1755 dictionary of the English language offers valuable insight into what
goes on in the mind of those compelled to this extreme:
Having therefore no assistance but from
general grammar, I applied myself to the
perusal of our writers; and noting
whatever might be of use to ascertain or
illustrate any word or phrase,
accumulated in time the materials of a
dictionary, which, by degrees, I reduced
to method, establishing to myself, in the
progress of the work, such rules as
experience and analogy suggested to me;
experience, which practice and
observation were continually increasing;
and analogy, which, though in some
words obscure, was evident in others.100
He later comments, “I have endeavoured to proceed with a scholar's reverence for
antiquity, and a grammarian's regard to the genius of our tongue.” While we have no
such preface from Philo, it is not hard to believe he shared a purist mentality with his
distant scholarly descendant.
While on the surface Johnson’s project appears to be merely descriptive, it’s
clear that his goal was to look through the corpus of English texts, as many as he had
access to, and to render out comprehensible explanations of the meanings of the
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words he found. His “reverence for antiquity” hints at a prescriptive underpinning,
inasmuch as one way to slow change in language is to keep older forms alive.
Philo, however, seems even more driven than Johnson towards some sort of
perfectionism in language and does not share with him the sort of democratic,
descriptive method of lexicography characteristic of Aristophanes of Byzantium.
Indeed, all evidence suggests Philo took the much more extreme position that there is
some sort of higher order directing language and that words must adhere to certain
absolute and immutable rules. It is no concern of his, for example, that an adjective
form is regularly used as an adverb, even if an ancient source treats it that way. The
rules of the language mandate that adverbs must form and be used in a prescribed
manner, and so wherever he finds a usage that does not accord with the rules, he
brands it incorrect, no matter the authority of the user.
For this reason, Philo appears to have much more in common with the
thinking of Noah Webster. In the 1828 preface to his dictionary, Webster says:
I spent ten years in this comparison of
radical words, and in forming a
synopsis of the principal words in
twenty languages, arranged in classes,
under their primary elements or
letters. The result has been to open
what are to me new views of
language, and to unfold what appear
to be the genuine principles on which
these languages are constructed.101
In this regard, his mode of thinking is closer to Philo’s. Webster, for instance, pursues
the principles which underlie the language, whereas Johnson employs the usage of
words only in order to extrapolate their meaning. In this way, Webster provides a
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valuable point of comparison in the broader lexicographic tradition because his
preface suggests that Philo’s principle-based mode of thinking is not restricted to
ancient scholarship. It is, rather, something that may drive the work of anyone who is
inclined to put rules above practice. For this reason, perhaps, it is not surprising that
few scholars are known to have emulated and reproduced Philo’s approach to
lexicography in late antiquity. But he did find sympathizers elsewhere.
In 1926, H. W. Fowler published A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. It is
a nearly 750-page volume of alphabetized comments concerning the use of different
English words and phrases such as this one:
Imaginary/Imaginative. The
meanings of the two are quite
distinct, and never interchangeable.
That is imaginary which exists only
in someone’s imagination; he, or his
powers or products, is imaginative
who is able or apt to form mental
pictures. Any confusion between the
two is due to the fact that there are
things to which either can be
applied, though in difference senses,
and with some such things the
distinction is not always apparent.
The difference between an
imaginary and an imaginative
person is clear enough, but that
between imaginary and imaginative
distress is elusive; the begging
impostor exploits the former; the
latter is created and experienced...by
the tragic or lyric poet.102
Also this passage:
Historic(al). The differentiation
between the two forms has reached
the stage at which it may fairly be
said that the use of one in a sense
now generally expressed by the
102
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other is a definite backsliding. The
ordinary word is historical; historic
means memorable, or assured of a
place in history; historical should
not be substituted for it in that
sense; the only other function
retained by historic is in the
grammarians’ technical terms
historic tenses, moods, sequence,
present, etc., in which it preserves
the notion appropriate to the
narration of the past of which it has
been in general use robbed by
historical.103
Fowler’s resemblance to Philo in methodology is notable, especially in that two
individuals so far apart in time were both driven to sanction use of their respective
languages in this way and to this extent. The answer can be nothing so simple as
labelling them grammarians gone mad. More likely, they were both highly educated
scholars who came to understand a simple yet profound concept of language: words
have a special relationship to reality. They are the unique mechanism by which people
can relate the world to one another: as it is, as it seems, or even as it may never be but
could.
This relation, however, operates correctly only when all the parties involved
have a mutual understanding of the meaning, constituent elements, and proper
function of words. In that case, the lexicographer’s task is to record this relationship
in the form of a definition which identifies as precisely as possible what thing or
action a word represents. Aristophanes of Byzantium made this connection through a
careful examination of usage, past and present, domestic and foreign. The way in
which a word was or had been employed dictated its meaning.
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For Philo and Ammonius ̶ also Fowler and to some extent Webster as well ̶
this was not satisfactory. That a word was used to mean something which it should
not by reason of its etymology or form was an error in need of correction, a violation
of the “genuine principles” that govern, or should govern, language. From this radical
perspective, there must be a strong logical connection between the form and the
meaning of a word based on higher linguistic principles such as grammatical rules or
etymology. These supersede established use or tradition or authority.
The work of later lexicographers shows that Philo’s attitude did not persist
long in the tradition of ancient Greek scholarship. The fact is, the meanings of words
change often without any obvious rationale. Thus, Philo’s was a noble but losing
effort. How then to understand the impulse behind his attempt to bring the Greek
language to heel and impose some sort of ideal state that recalls but is not slavishly
addicted to the classical standard, to impose the rule of truths that prevail over time
and tradition? Again, Samuel Johnson offers one solution:
Among these unhappy mortals is
the writer of dictionaries; whom
mankind have considered, not as
the pupil, but the slave of
science, the pioneer of literature,
doomed only to remove rubbish
and clear obstructions from the
paths of Learning and Genius,
who press forward to conquest
and glory, without bestowing a
smile on the humble drudge that
facilitates their progress. Every
other authour may aspire to
praise; the lexicographer can only
hope to escape reproach and even
this negative recompense has
been yet granted to very few.104
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Johnson’s lexicographer receives neither the grand accolades of an author nor the
recognition of a scientist, but without the lexicographer’s labour of identifying and
codifying language, all written work teeters on the brink of unintelligibility. He who
chooses to write a dictionary attempts to render into a static and stable form
something not only intangible, but mercurial and metamorphic. Although Philo’s
work may seem to some to have “a certain amount of banality,” his intention is far
from commonplace.105
There have always been those who ask “What’s the right way to say this
word?” or “Am I using this phrase correctly?,” to whom the purists of the world are
bold enough to rise and answer their questions. Herennius Philo sought to impose a
certain level of logical consistency on ancient Greek, but it was a losing battle. One
need only compare modern English to Fowler’s prescriptions to understand that even
the most extensive and detailed commentaries on what purports to be correct usage
can only do so much or be so effective. Despite Fowler’s caution that, “Between you
& I is a piece of false grammar not sanctioned, like the contrary lapse It is me, even
by colloquial usage,” everyone knows that denunciations of this sort have not
conditioned English speakers to say “It is I,” at least not without projecting
grandiosity and excessive propriety.106 To many ancients, Philo’s admonitions surely
sounded the same.
The reason why the corrective attitude of Philo and others fell out of favour is
that it was unable to overcome the changing tide of the language. If Fowler were alive
today, he would, no doubt, lament how today’s English usage has ignored most of his
rules. Consider one last passage from Philo:
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87. Eis and estha (two ways of saying
“you were”) are said to differ among
the Athenians. For it is clear that estha
expresses past time, while eis expresses
potential. And so Hector says,
“Deiphobos, truly before now you were
(estha) far from my dearest friend.”
And Menander says in the Kolax, “Sir,
last year you were (estha) a corpse and
a beggar, but now you are wealthy.”
And about eis, again Menander says in
the Pseuderakles, “Over wine, and not a
small portion, nurse, speak, and you
would become (eis) blameless, and you
will always have a perpetual 16th of
Boedromion.”107 And in general the
word is used in this way about the
future and follows our common usage,
such as, “if you know, if you speak, if
you are good.”108 And so he who says
to someone, “You were (eis) rich,” will
prove ignorant of the difference; for it
was proper for him to say estha.109
Clearly, ancient Greek speakers in the second century were apt to confuse these
forms, and Philo was, no doubt, just as ineffective as Fowler in steering his peers back
toward what he deemed proper usage. Indeed, in similar fashion, Fowler felt the need
to spend nearly four pages discussing correct subjunctive usage, and no one today
who understands English grammar is unaware that people regularly conflate the
indicative and subjunctive of “to be” forms like “was” and “were” in common usage.
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This is a reference to future more vivid conditions, such as “If you are good, you will be
happy.”
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ἦις, ἦσθα, φησίν, διαφέρει παρὰ το[ῖς] Ἀττικοῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦσθα τὸν παρῳχημένον χρόνον
δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ᾖς τὸν μέλλοντα. ὁ γοῦν Ἕκτωρ φησίν (Hom. Il. xxii 233)· ‘Δηΐφοβ’, ἦ μέν μοι τὸ πάρος
πολὺ φίλτατος ἦσθα’. καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Κόλακι (50 sq. Keo.—Th.2) ‘ἄνθρωπε, πέρυσι νεκρὸς ἦσθα
καὶ πτωχός, νυν<ὶ> δὲ πλουτεῖς’. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ᾖς πάλιν Μένανδρος (fr. 454 Keo.—Th.2) ἐν Ψευδηρακλεῖ
‘ὑπὲρ μὲν οἴνου μηδὲ γρύ, τίτθη, λέγε, ἂν τἆλλα δ’ ᾖς ἄμεμπτο[ς], ἕκτην ἐπὶ δέκα Βοηδρομιῶνος
ἐνδελεχῶς ἕξεις ἀεί’. καὶ καθόλου πάντα οὕτως λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ κατὰ τὴν <ἡμ>ετέραν
συνήθειαν, οἷον «ἐὰν νοῇς· ἐὰν λαλῇς· ἐὰν ᾖς ἀγαθός». ὁ γοῦν λέγων πρός τινα «ᾖς ποτε πλούσιος»,
ἀγνοήσει τὴν διαφοράν· δέον γὰρ ἦν φάναι «ἦσθα».
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Although millennia apart, both Fowler and Philo were gripped by this same desire to
preserve moribund distinctions in their languages, and while some may argue it is too
soon to say that Fowler failed, it is clear that Philo did.
According to Samuel Johnson’s interpretation, lexicographers make language
intelligible, yet their attachment to the past, to the word already written,
simultaneously makes them obsolete and irrelevant. While the language continues to
evolve under their feet, they spend their time forging a set of rules for a
communication system that has already outpaced them. Such was Philo’s fate. To
judge from what remains of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, we can see that
Philo expended considerable effort in analysing his native tongue and uncovering the
deeper linguistic principles which inform it, yet the Greek from which he derived
these principles was already dying in his day. It is true of every lexicographer that the
connection between his rules and the language to which they are meant to pertain
grows more and more strained over time, until eventually the tether that holds them
together snaps. In Philo’s case, that tie was slender to start with and broke within a
matter of centuries.
What, then, are we to make of Philo’s attempt to control language? It would be
far too simplistic to identify his effort as a failure and move on, especially in light of
modern parallels. Whether one chooses to look at the Académie française and its
efforts to preserve the “purity” of the French language, or Katharevousa Greek, the
eighteenth-century compromise between Demotic and Ancient Greek, questions of
controlling language are never simple or insignificant. Instead, let us ask this
question: was Herennius Philo’s failure born of a perverse and contagious obsession,
or does it offer a glimpse into the nature of lexicography itself?
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The thread common to Aristophanes, Johnson, Philo, and Webster is that they
all understood that lexicography is fundamentally a boundary. The regularized and
consistent entity which we call “correct language” lies within the cover of a
dictionary, yet we know well that slang, colloquialisms, idioms (or idia, perhaps), and
euphemisms are used widely, even though they live outside the dictionary. Does one
speak “incorrectly” when describing the deceased as “pushing up daisies?” Philo’s
restrictions on language proved too narrow to be tenable, but even so, it is difficult to
imagine that Aristophanes, even with his lack of prescription, managed to fully
encapsulate the Greek of his time. For while much information is contained in lexica,
both ancient and modern, they are often limited by their inability to illuminate usages
and meanings that lie outside of the self-imposed boundaries of their discipline.
It is the burden of those who wish to understand the meanings of words to
realize that whatever meaning they grasp will never be completely and utterly
comprehensive. Language, by its nature, is amorphous and variable, while any lexicon
which endeavours to control it is static and fixed. It is incumbent upon us, then, to
realize that the definitions we find in dictionaries are not necessarily absolute or
objective. They exist as a consequence of human judgement, where, at some level, an
individual made the decision to assert a particular meaning on a word and pronounce
certain usages and definitions correct and others not, if only by implication. Although
we often treat words as the ground floor of language, the starting point from which we
determine meaning, it is equally important to recognize that our understanding of such
is not based on some objective measure, but instead layers of human interpretation.
Yet this was unsatisfactory for Herennius Philo. As a result of his erudition,
Philo sought to refine language into a logically consistent entity, excluding the
irregularities that human speakers create. As history unfolded, however, his mandates
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proved insufficient. The human variability of language prevailed. Despite Philo’s
failure, later scholars nevertheless picked up a similar banner for their own languages,
only to meet a similar fate. Perhaps this is simply the destiny of the learned.
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APPENDIX A: Translation of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus

De Diversis Verborum Significationibus
Beginning of alpha
1. Athlon differs from epathlon; for an athlon is “the struggle itself”, but the
epathlon is “the gift given to the one victorious.”
2. Astron differs from aster; for astron is “the form established from many
stars,” but an aster is “the object itself shining.”
3. Astrologia differs from astronomia; for astronomia is “the apprehension of
the stars,” but astrologia is “the knowledge which makes manifest the results from the
motions of the stars.”
4. Arachne differs from arachnes; for the arachne is “the thinnest web of the
animal,” that is to say of the spider, but the arachnes is the animal itself, pronounced
as a masculine noun.
5. Aner differs from anthropos; for an aner is properly “one who is
distinguished in some virtue,” but an anthropos is distinguished in nothing.
6. An anathēma differs from an anathĕma. For an anathēma, written with an
eta, is “a thing both consecrated and set up in some divine place;” but an anathĕma,
written with an epsilon, is “a thing having outrage and a curse.”
7. An ágroikos with a baritone and an agroîkos with a circumflex differ. For
the ágroikos with a baritone is “one without a share of knowledge;” the agroîkos with
a circumflex is “one passing his time in the field or an untamed man, equal to a wild
beast.”
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8. Apokeruktos and ekpoietos differ; for an apokeruktos is “the one who has
been thrown from his home due to some wrong doing,” but an ekpoietos is “one given
up for adoption.”
9. Apekéruxe and epekéruxe differ. For they say that kerûxai and apokerûxai
are “to give away something for another because of a herald.” Menander says,
“Agamemnon renounced her,”110 as if by a herald. But epikerûxai is “to promise to
give money to the one who has gathered and killed one of the condemned.”
10. Aparaskeuos differs from aparaskeuastos. For the one who has the office
of producer through himself would be called aparaskeuos, but one who has it from
another would be called aparaskeuastos. For the arch-priest intending to give
gladiators is aparaskeuos, but those gladiators are aparaskeuastoi. For the first attacks
the appearance by another because it is passive, the other is free power. And so the
one conflating these speaks incorrectly.
11. Halipaston differs from halispartos. For they say that the meat or fish
sprinkled with salt is halipaston, but a space having been sown with salt is
halispartos. For some of the ancient, hostile barbarians neighbouring the Greek lands
sowed salt till the land was no longer able to bear fruit. For this reason, life calls those
who have been terribly mistreated and have hard to cure bodies halispartoi.
12. Agein and pherein differ; for inspirited things are led (agein), but things
without spirit are borne (pherein). And according to Homer, “here there is not such of
mine, as the Achaeans would either bear (pheroien) or lead (agoien) away.”111 And
again “They were leading the sheep, and brought glorious wine.”112

110
111
112

fr. 658 Kow.-Th.
Il. V 483
Od. IV 622
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13. Arrostos differs from arroston; for one who is unable to accomplish
something according to their desires is arrostos, but one who is diseased is ill
(arrostei). So Aristotle says.
14. Aûthis and aûthi without the sigma differ; for aûthis is “again” or “after
these events,” but aûthi is also “the very thing here”. And so Callimachus says
wrongly, “Right here (aûthi) I would strip this off, my weight,”113 instead of “after
these events.” And in the Hecale, “For this, father, release me, and you would receive
safety right here (aûthi),”114 instead of “again” (palin).
15. Arrodein and orrodein are opposites of one another. For orrodein, written
with an omicron, indicates “one who acts cautiously;” they think the word follows
thus, the orros is said to be the place about the buttocks, they say also that it is the
tauros; and because of this, this place of the birds is called the orropugion, not, as
some are unaware, the orthopugion. It has been said truly, that orros is the place of
the rump and is just as the orropugion. Those who are cautious are accustomed to
drawing back their genitals when faced with something, often the irrational ones of
the animals are accustomed to draw back the tail when one is cautions about
something. And so sensibly, from the previous reasoning, orrodein is said in regard to
being cautious. And Euripides introduces Perseus, saying “For I have never done
wrong against those who have suffered terrible things, I myself fearing that I would
suffer them.”115 and orrodein is such an action. But arrodein is the opposite, this is
not “to be cautious,” but “to aim at and to have taken courage.”
16. Aponoia differs from anoia. Aponoia is “some rage and hateful
arrogance;” but anoia, being a loss of the mind, is pitied rather than hated.

113
114
115

fr. 1,35 Pf.
fr. 238,4 Pf.
Andromeda fr. 130 N.2
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17. Amunesthai and amunein differ. For amunesthai is “to punish those who
have done wrong,” whereas amunein is “to come to the aid of others.”
18. Ateles and ateleston differ. For ateles is “something which has never been
completed,” but ateleston is “something not able to be finished.” And so those who
conflate these speak incorrectly.
19. Apologeisthai differs from apologizesthai. For apologizesthai is “to give a
necessary speech of expenses,” and the mathematicians say “to account a single
thing.” Apologeisthai is “to dismantle an accusation with a speech.”
20. Aito and aitoumai differ. For aito is said in regard to taking and not
returning, but aitoumai is said in regard to needing to return. Menander expresses this
difference in the Dyskolos: “For I am not asking for fire, nor asking to borrow
dishes.”116
21. Aidos and aischune differ. For aidos is “reverence for each which one
considers venerable,” but aiskune is “a shameful feeling about those actions which
each person has done in error so that they not accomplish some action.” And one
reveres (aidetai) their father, but feels shame (aischunetai) for becoming intoxicated.
Aristoxenos the musician demonstrates this in his Laws of Teaching.117 Indeed, he
says one must understand a distinction between aidos and aischune, because aidos
concerns age, virtue, experience, and honour. For he who knows to show reverence
towards the eminence of each of the items mentioned comes to be so disposed, not
through some fault, but through revering and honouring the aforementioned
eminences. Aischune is first an offence against every man in regard to customary
disgraces and also against oneself, for one also shames themselves.

116
117

fr. 123 and 410 Koe.-Th.
fr. 42A Wehrli
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22. Ámetos and ametós differ. For ámetos is “the season of summer,” but
ametós is “the harvest,” as if one is harvesting fruit.
23. Apoleipei and ekballei differ. For a woman leaves (apoleipei) a man, but a
man casts out (ekballei) a woman.
24. Antikru is “piercingly straightforward,” antikrus is “expressly visible.”
25. Amphi is “around,” amphis is “apart at either side.”
26. Aktai are “rocky places lying in the ocean,” thines are “beaches.”
27. Apophora and eisphora differ. For apophora is “the payment by the
subjugated to their masters,” but eisphora is “the product given to the public by the
citizens.”
28. Harpagé and harpáge differ among the Attics, as Tryphon says in his third
work concerning Attic prosody.118 For if we speak it with an oxytone, as is
convention, it will be clear that it is “a sudden and violent seizing.” If we should
speak harpáge with a baritone, as with anágke, it is “that on which they take up water
vessels from wells.” And we realize this from Menander, “A cup, a table, a downward
hook, water,”119 and in the Hydroxous, “We do not know the child but the robbery
which he himself prepared,”120 and Aristophanes says as much in the Niobos.121
29. Asphódelos and asphodelós differ among the Attics according to their
oxytone. Tryphon, among others, says this in his second work on Attic prosody.122
For the one accented with a baritone is the plant among the ancients, but the one
accented with the oxytone is the location in which the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon
himself is somewhat inclined to write the place with the same accentuation as the
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121
122

fr. 12 Vels.
fr. 657 Koe.-Th.
fr. 180 Koe.-Th.
fr. Nov.
fr. 14 Vels.
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plant. For often, he says, the surroundings are said with the same accent as what is
being surrounded. For we also speak of garlic heads themselves and this has come to
overlap with where they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the crocus plant itself and the
place in which it grows.
30. Andragathia differs from andreia. For andreia is “the commendable
power of the body,” but andragathia has apparent mental virtue.
31. Hama and homou differ. For hama is an adverb of time, but homou is an
adverb of place. And so Solon lived at the same time (hama) as Anacharsis the
Scythian, if indeed he did flourish at that same time; however, they were not at the
same place (homou). For they were not born in the same place, but one in Athens, the
other in Scythia. Homer also shows this, “There then arose both (hama) a wailing and
a shout of triumph from the men,”123 referring to the same time. And, “But when they
were prepared, each with (hama) their generals…,”124 and, “Together (hama), they all
raised their reins upon their horses.”125 And about place, he says, “I grew up together
with (homou) her,”126 and again, “But together (homou) the planks of the ships and
the bodies of the men…,” instead of saying in the same place. “Lord Agamemnon
took his two sons in one chariot, together (homou) restraining the swift horses.”127 But
there are times when Homer employs the word homou in a temporal sense, as
Asklepiades says, “If indeed both war and plague together (homou) overpower the
Achaeans…,”128 unless one then also says “now together” in the same place, such as
“in Troy, war and plague are overpowering the Achaeans.”
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Il. IV 450 sq. VIII 64 sq.
Il. III 1
Il. XXIII 362
Od. XV 365
Il. XI 126 sq.
FHG III 299
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32. Ainos and paroimia differ. For an ainos is “a mythic story brought out
from unreasoning animals or plants meant for the advice of humans,” as Lucillius
Tarraius says in his first work concerning fables.129 For instance, one may come from
the unreasoning animals as with Archilochus, “This is a certain legend of men,
wherein the fox and the eagle established a partnership…,”130 and so on. And again
whenever he says, “I will tell a certain legend to you, Kerykide, sorrowing staff,”131
and then puts forward, “The ape had been separated from the animals, alone at the far
reaches. There, the wily fox, with his firm mind, met him.”132 And Hesiod says,
“Now I will tell a legend to the wise kings and others, this hawk addressed the
nightingale with variegated neck, holding it high above in the clouds, caught in its
talons…,”133 and one may come from plants, as in Callimachus, “Indeed, hear this
legend. Once, on Mount Tmolus, the ancient Lydians say a struggle brought about a
grove at an olive tree,”134 and so on. And an ainos is an unfolded proverb. A paroimia
has the reference from the main point upon the worse, lacking the legend, and is
received from something outside, such as, “Leave the bulls ever in the field,” and “Ivy
after Anthesteria.”
33. Arti and artios differ. For arti is an adverb of time, but artios concerns a
finished, completed work, just as Sappho says in error, “Completely (artios), GoldSandalled Dawn…,”135 instead of the temporal arti. Among the Attics, artios is an
indication of the current year, but arti the year on-going and about the time past.

129
130
131
132
133
134
135

fr. 1 Linn.
fr. 174 W.
fr. 185, 1-2 W.
fr. 185, 3-6 W.
Opp. 202 sqq.
fr. 194, 6-8 Pf.
fr. 123 L.-P., cf. 123 and 103, 10 Voigt
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34. Âra and ára differ. For the one said with a circumflex is a dubitative
conjunction, and we say it when we are in doubt, “How, then (âra), will he do the
deed?” The one with the shortened accent is logical, “If it is day, there is light. But in
fact it is day, so then (ára) there is light.” “If it is useful to do this, then (ára) we must
do it.”
35. Aithe and ophelon differ. For the first expression does not show person,
but ophelon does show person, such as “if only I, if only you, if only he.” And
otherwise, aithe is an adverb, ophelon is both a verb and an adverb.
36. Âthlos masculine and âthlon neuter differ. For the masculine indicates the
contest, but the neuter indicates the prize. Homer says, “Indeed this awesome contest
(aethlos) has come to an end,”136 and about the prizes, “After taking your prizes
(aethlia),…”137

Beginning of beta
37. Bomos, hestia, eschara, and megaron differ, and just as Ammonius
Lamptreus says in his first work concerning offerings, “Bomoi are those which have
entryways, an eschara is the one begetting a use for life on the earth, hestiai are
extravagant, and a megaron is the enclosed hestia symbolizing the home.”138 “The
hestia of noble Odysseus, at which I have arrived...”139 and he is both hearth-less and
homeless. And the goddess is corporeal according to Hesiod, “Hestia and Demeter,
and Gold-Sandalled Hera,...”140 And Neanthes Cyzikus says in his third work on the

136
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Od. XXII 5
Il. XXIII 736
FgrH 361 F 1 a
Hom. Od. XIV 159 XVII 156 XIX 304 XX 231
Theog. 454
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city that bomoi are for the gods, escatai are for heroes. In Euripides, esxara appears
instead of bomos in the Pleisthenes, “Offer the sheep upon the altars (escharais) of
the gods,” as does Sophocles in the Chryse.
38. Basileus and koiranos differ. For basileus is “the one who inherits from his
father the right to rule from birth,” but a koiranos is “one who accomplishes the due
deed of a basileus,” such as Achilles was for his wrath, “So masterfully did he
manage his army,”141 Moreover, a hegemon is the one conducting military
arrangement, as Homer says, “Now when they were organized, each with their
generals...’
39. Boulei and boule differ. This is because they say the word boulei
indicatively, for instance, “You intend (boulei) to be angry with me,” but the word
boule we understand subjunctively, “If you should intend (boule) it, we shall find a
way.” Boulê written with a circumflex indicates “an idea.”

Beginning of gamma
40. Gamelion and epithalamion differ. For an epithalamion is “a poem of
marriage written at sea,” but a gamelion is “he who is not limited by time.”
41. Gamélia and gamelía differ. Gamélia are “the things accomplished on the
day on which the wedding is completed,” or “the gifts given in the wedding.”
Gamelía is “the registration and legal cause for marriage given to the community,”
which they also call koureotis. And they use the phrase “wedding rites,” which those
who register the youths and intend for them to marry make offerings to their fellow

141

Hom. Il. II 207
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people. The ceremony is carried out for Hera, Aphrodite, and the Wedding Graces; or
it is an offering for the deities of the deme.
42. Geron, presbutes, and probebekos differ. Alexion says thus in his epitome
of the collected works of Didymos, “From the works of Aristophanes concerning
Man, it ranges from birth and growth until old age. For a brephos is ‘one newly born,’
a paidion is ‘one being nourished by a nurse,’ a paidarion is ‘one already walking and
grasping speech,’ a paidiskos is ‘one in the clinging age,’ a pais is ‘the one able to go
through daily education.’ Some call this clinging age pallax, others say boupais, or
antipais, or mellephebos. After these, he is called ephebos. In Cyrene, they call the
epheboi triakatios, and in Crete, they call them apodromoi because they do not yet
take part in communal races; the Achaeans say kouros and agouros, as also do the
Attics. After this, one is called meirakion or meirax, then neaniskos, and neanias, then
aner mesos, then probebekos – which they also call homogeros –, then geron, then
presbutes, and finally eschatogeros.”142
43. Gramma differs from stoicheion. For a stoicheion is “the very
pronunciation and sound,” from which comes the representation in letters, the form,
or the appearance, as in forming delta the triangle, the delta is with three lines, the
omicron is formed as a circle. The stoicheion is complete, such as alpha, beta,
gamma, and the remaining stoicheia. Stoicheia, however, are wrongly called
grammata. Already the ancients were calling suggrammata grammata, and again,
“But after Plato had picked up one gramma, the one about the soul,...”143 And we say
in common speech, “He knows many grammata.” For he is not acquainted with the 24
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Frr. 37-66 Sl.
Callim. Epigr. 23, 3-4 Pf.
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letters, but many grammata. In this way, the one acquainted with many words is
called grammatikos.

Beginning of delta
44. Diskos and solos differ. For a diskos is “a pierced stone,” as Tryphon says
in his fifth work on Hellenism, and a solos is “a solid lump of copper.” Homer also
says, “the massive solos,”144 and elsewhere, “Take the diskos,”145 and then continues,
“And the lithos sounded.”146 Pindar says, “Whenever with the stone diskoi,…”147
45. Dikastes and diaitetes differ. A dikastes is “the judge selected according to
custom,” a diaitetes is “the one chosen according to the good collective fortune of
coincidence.” Menander says in his Pais, “If some dikastes or diaitetes of the
gods...”148
46. Diephthartai and diephthore differ. One has been sacked (diephthartai) by
others, but has sacked (diephthore) another. Aristophanes says in the Horas, “You
have violated (diephthoras) our oath,”149 and Menander says in the Adelphoi, “If this
man has violated (diephthoros) the girl,”150 and Homer says, “Crazed man, you have
defiled (diephthoras) your mind,”151 instead of saying that he had defiled
(diephtharakas) his mind.
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47. Dyspeithes differs from apeithes. For the first is “one who angrily accepts
a believable definition,” but apeithes is “one who is knocked over and is unable to
feel the pain.”
48. Demeter and Damater differ among Attic writers. Tryphon says, “For
Demeter is the name of the goddess, Damater is the name of the miracle.”152
49. Douloi, oiketai, and therapontes differ among the ancients. Douloi is said
of pleasures and all the people organized by a king, oiketai by a despotes, and
therapontes of organized allies, by whom those who have arrived are served.
50. Diaboetos and epiboetos differ. For a diaboetos is “one recognized for his
virtue,” but an epiboetos is “one who has a wretched reputation.” Anakreon in his
second work says, “And you will make me a wretch (epiboeton) among my
neighbours.”153 Some of the poets call this epiphatos and epirretos.
51. Diploun and diplasion, it is said, differ. For diploun is said of things based
on their size, and diplasion based on their number, for instance, “twice as many
(diplasia) coins.” Diploun is said of things which are doubled, just as about clothes
being folded, “the doubled (diploun) cloak,” not diplasion. For diplasion is used for
the differences in size or number other than dimension, such as, “This is twice
(diplasion) the size of that,” and, “This city is twice (diplasion) as far away as that
one,” not “diploun.”
52. Dichótomos with the baritone, as in antítupos, and dichotómos with the
paroxytone, as in oikodómos, differ. For the first is passive, while the second is active.
For when we pronounce it with the baritone, they are clearly “being split in two,” but
when we pronounce it with a paroxytone accent, they “are splitting in two.”
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53. Doasato and doiasato differ, because doasato is equivalent to edoxe, but
doiasato with the iota is equivalent to edistasen.

Beginning of epsilon
54. Eleatros and edeatros differ. For an eleatros is “a cook at the eleoi” – eleoi
are the cooking tables – but an edeatros is “the one who tastes the food.”
55. Epítimos and epitímios differ. For an epítimos is “an honoured citizen,” an
epitímios is “one liable for punishment and reprehensible.” For this reason, we call
epiplexis epitimesis and say, “Punish (epitimeson) him,” instead of epiplexon.
56. Endoxos and epidoxos differ. For the first is “one who is remarkable,” but
epidoxos is “one who is expected.”
57. Hetairos and philos differ. For a philos is also a hetairos, but a hetairos is
not always a philos. For a hetairos is also a colleague. For this reason, Homer says
about the wind, “a good sail-swelling companion (hetairos).”154
58. Ekgonos and apogonos, they say, differ clearly. For an ekgonos is “a son,”
but an apogonos is “a grandson or further descendent.” The rhetoricians misuse it
when they say apogonos instead of huios.
59. Helkos, oteile, trauma, and plege differ. For a helkos is “a singular,
lingering pain caused by an iron,” and can also be self-inflicted. It is also said about
wounding the skin. Oteile is similarly “a beating from an iron.” A trauma is “a wound
inflicted by an iron upon a sound body.” A plege is “a strike from a hand.”
60. Epikouroi and boethoi differ. For epikouroi are “those who are allies and
rally for those under attack,” but boethoi are “the allies of those attacking.” Homer
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preserves this distinction throughout his poetry, for the epikouroi belong to the
besieged Trojans and the boethoi are the allies of the Greeks. And so one cannot find
in his work a named epikouros of the Greeks, only the Trojans.
61. Herkos and herkion differ. A herkos is “a wall for cities,” a herkion is “a
wall for homes.”
62. Heterophthalmos and monophthalmos differ. A heterophthalmos is “one
who has been mutilated in one of the eyes through a puncture wound,” but a
monophthalmos is “one who has always had only one eye,” like a Cyclops.
63. Eoikota differ from eikota. For eikota are believable, eoikota are
appearances.
64. Euphyes and eumathes differ among the Attics. For they say euphyes as a
joke, and eumathe for “one well disposed to learning.”
65. Exanepsioi and anepsioi differ. And this is because the Attics distinguish
the nouns by the accent, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody,
“exanépsioi is like amérimnoi, with a recessed accent,” he says, “different than the
noun anepsiós with the oxytone.”155
66. Echthros differs from a polemios and a dusmenes. For an echthros is “one
who was once a friend,” a polemios is “one advancing with arms against his
neighbours,” and a dusmenes is “one who has maintained hatred for some long time
against an ally and is unable to reconcile.”
67. Exeleutheros and apeleutheros differ. For they call “those born and given
up to money-lenders due to a debt” exeleutheros, then apoluthentas, and then
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eleutherothentas. Commonly, they call those presently free from slavery
apeleutheros, as Tryphon says in his fifth work on Hellenism.156
68. Epikedeion and threnos differ. For an epikedeion is the word for “burial,”
threnos is the word for “such and such a time” as Tryphon says.157 Aristokles of
Rhodes says to the contrary in his work on poetics, “Threnos is the song of misfortune
which has a personal name, for it has lamentation along with praise of the departed.
And so some in general say threnos, while others make a distinction between threnos
and epikedeios, that the threnos is sung at the time of the misfortune in front of the
tomb and after the burial, as well as on the anniversary of the funeral, and sung by the
handmaids and those with them, but that the epikedeion constitutes praise of the
deceased amidst some lamentation in verse.”
69. Emeio and emoio differ. For emeio is without an article, as Homer says,
“Compose my word (emeio de suntheo muthon),” and emou is with an article. For
instance, “my child (paida emou),” and, “of my child (tou emou paidos).” And Homer
says, “Remember your father (patros soio),”158 instead of, “your father (tou sou
patros).”
70. Erotan and punthanesthai differ. For punthanesthai is “to listen to what is
said by someone exactly as reported,” the listener not making an erotesis; erotan,
however, is “to intend to grasp some summary said in regard to an undertaken action.”
And indeed Telemachus says to Nestor, “You have asked (eireai) from what place we
are, and indeed I will tell you,”159 and Achilles says, “But come now, Patroclus, friend
of Zeus, ask Nestor.”160 Because it is agreed that punthanesthai is plainly listening to
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those speaking, and it is evident when Telemachus says, “Now indeed I am grown and
I seek (punthanomai) advice listening to others,”161 and Odysseus says, “I inquired
(punthanomen) about Ithaca.”162 According to the philosophers, erotesis is “an
utterance seeking a guaranteed reply,” for example, “Yes, No, Uncertain, Certain,
Unclear.” For these five replies are called “symbolic.” When, however, it is not so, we
instead reply otherwise to these questions, for instance, “Is it daytime?” and so we
will say, “It is daytime,” “It’s day,” or, “Yes it is.” Peusis is “a question to which is
not possible to be answered in a guaranteed fashion,” for instance, “Where does
Ariston live?” For you will say, “In this place.” Hektor says, “Where has Andromache
gone?”163 and the handmaiden replies that, “She has gone to the great tower of
Troy.”164 For this was not a guaranteed matter of “Yes” or “No.” According to an
agreement on the preferred usage, the philosophers differ on this distinction, inquiring
they talk about the difference.
71. Erotesis differs from peusis and anakrisis. For erotesis is “a brief answer,”
peusis is “a report of a long deed,” anakrisis is “an examination of the two.”
72. Estai differs from genesetai. For estai refers to things now in reality,
whereas genesetai refers to things about to chance upon creation, just as a young man
will be (estai) old, but children will be born (genesetai) to the childless.
73. Heurein and heurasthai differ. For heurein is as in common speech,
heurasthai is “to have found some such way.” Menander says in the Dyskolos, “I have
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found the skill for this,”165 and Diphilos says in the Pyrrha, “My own gift, found from
the gods.”166
74. Eran differs from pothein. Eran concerns those in one’s eyes, pothein
concerns things far away. Homer distinguishes these,“As I love you (eramai) now and
sweet longing seizes me,”167 Zeus says to Hera while she is present, but in absence,
“But it was a longing (pothos) for you and your counsel...”168 Homer keenly preserves
such differences.
75. Eumorphos differs from eueide. For eumorphos is “one who has a good
figure,” such as one with a fair face, as we also say “configuring the face.” Eueides is
“one who has a beautiful appearance,” such as the entire body.
76. Endon differs from eso. For endon is “in places,” eso is “towards a place.”
For a child is inside, but I am going outside. And so he is wrong who says, “I am
going inside (endon),” or “The child is outside (eso).” Sophocles confounds this
difference and says in the Trachiniai, “Women, both those in (eso) the house, and
those further beyond.”169 It is proper to say, “Women, those within (endon) the
house.” And Euripides says in the Hercules, “the old man and old woman in (eso) the
house,”170 instead of endon. And Euboulos the middle comic poet says in the
Kalathephoroi, “You will find out in some way, it is a certain old man inside,”171 but
it is proper to say endon.
77. Entauthoi, entautha, and enthade differ. For it is clear that entauthoi is the
indication of “in a place,” entautha is both “in a place” and “toward a place;” enthade
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is similar. Entha is the word for both “in a place” and “toward a place” and is used
instead of the temporal adverb tote. Homer uses the word entauthoi, “Sit there
(entauthoi) now, keeping away the pigs and dogs,”172 and Sophocles in the Electra
says about entautha, “to send you there (entautha), into that place (entha) where you
will not see the light of the sun.”173 For it has the indication of both “towards a place”
and “in a place.” Similarly, Calypso says it to mean “from a place,” “Staying here
(enthade) in this place you would hold this house with me.”174 And Hektor says, “But
here the vultures will devour you.”175 For these uses indicate in a place. As regards
toward a place, “Odysseus will go there (enthade) within this very year.”176 For the
usage of entha as “in a place,” “There (entha) lies war-like Ajax, there lies
Achilles,”177 and towards a place, “There (entha) we sailed, and some god guided
us,”178 instead of the temporal adverb tote, and, “And here Pallas Athena gave to
Diomedes, son of Tydeus...”179
78. Entha, however, can also mean tote, as in, “Then (entha) the rest of the
Achaeans showed their approval,” and “place where,” as in “There (entha) we sailed,
and some god guided us,” as well as “in this or that place,” as in, “There lies war-like
Ajax, there lies Achilles, there lies Patroclus.”
79. Ex hosou and ex hotou differ. Ex hosou concerns time, ex hotou concerns
someone or something.
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80. Epistrephes differs from eustraphes. For epistraphes is “one who is
careful,” eustraphes is “one who is capable of handling changes.”
81. Euthus, euthu, and eutheos differ. For a straight rod is “euthus,” euthu is
used of the path to the gymnasium, instead of “straight to” the gymnasium or “like a
straight rod;” eutheos is used in place of an adverb of time. And so he is wrong who
conflates these, as evidenced by Menander in the Dyskolos, “What do you mean? Did
you go straight (euthus) there, knowing and asking for a freed slave?”180 And
Aristophanes the Grammarian in his work On the Pinakes of Callimachus and On
Antiphanes distinguishes this word. He says, however, that some of the ancients use
euthus as a temporal adverb. And so he says about the word, “It is necessary to use
euthu for something straight, for instance, if it is a feminine noun, ‘the straight stick,’
or a masculine one, ‘the straight rod,’ and even if it is one we call neuter, ‘the straight
post.’ The ancients also sometimes use euthu about an extant road in some place,
according to …, “I will go down that road as a free man,” and, “Since he knew this,
he was acting up and down.”
82. Enthumema and enthumion differ. For an enthumema is “the form of an
argument,” but an enthumion among the ancients is used in place of prostropaios; and
so Antiphon says in the Phonikoi, “After he has died, we will have a great sorrow
(enthumion).”

Beginning of zeta
83. Zelos and zelotupia differ. For a zelotupia is “something which has arisen
in hatred,” but zelos is “an imitation of something noble,” “A neighbor rivals (zeloi)
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his neighbor.”181 Hera, however, is jealous (zelotupei) of Heracles, of Selene and
Semele.
84. Zone and zonion differ. A zone is “a belt for men,” a zonion is one for
women.

Beginning of eta
85. Hesuchazein and sigan are said to differ. For hesuchizein is “to be still
throughout the entire body,” sigan is “not to speak.”
86. Hemera differs from eos. For hemera is incorporeal, which Hesiod traces
to Nyx, “And from Nyx were born Aither and Hemera.”182 And eos Hesiod attributes
to Theia, “And Theia begot great Helios and bright Selene, and Eos, who shines upon
everything on earth.”183 And about her corporeal form, Homer says, “However indeed
gold-throned Dawn seized Cleitus.”184
87. Eis and estha are said to differ among the Athenians. For it is clear that
estha expresses past time, while eis expresses potential. And so Hector says,
“Deiphobos, truly before now you were far from my dearest friend.”185 And
Menander says in the Kolax, “Sir, last year you were (estha) a corpse and a beggar,
but now you are wealthy.”186 And about eis, again Menander says in the
Pseuderakles, “Over wine, and not a small portion, nurse, speak, and you would
become (eis) blameless, and you will always have a perpetual 16th of Boedromion.”187
And in general the word is used in this way about the future and follows our common
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usage, such as, “if you should know, if you should speak, if you should be good.” And
so he who says to someone, “Should you ever be (eis) rich,” will prove ignorant of the
difference; for it was proper for him to say estha. To the contrary, Homer employs e
instead of ephe, “And the son of Cronos spoke and bowed his dark brow.”188 The
verbs differ in this way: e is employed in regard to the appearance of a single thirdperson, but ephe is about a third person, “I said, you said, that man said.”
88. Engua and enguato differ. Engua means “it was agreed to give,” enguato
refers to the one receiving. Enguo means “I agree to give,” enguomai means “I take
and guard in my hands.” For this reason, egcheirisai also means “to give.” For engue
is “trust in safety and a safe and secure gift.”

Beginning of theta
89. Theoros and theates differ. For a theoros is “one sent to the gods,” a
theates is ‘a member of the audience” and “one of the spectators.” Euripides says in
the Ion, “As a spectator (theates) or to seek an answer from the oracle?”189 which is to
say a theoros. And Aeschylus says, “You speak, as one who has consulted the god
(theoros) about such a deed.”190 Those who say, “I must watch (theoresai) the
contest,” are incorrect; it is proper to say “theasasthai.” Lysimachides carefully
demonstrates this in his work against Caecilius About the Attic Rhetoricians, and
makes many comparisons. And theasasthai, just as noted above, is used in reference
to a spectacle. Theorein, they say, is nothing other than “to reflect upon.” And for this
reason, not only those who are not sent for the sake of sacrifices, but also for the sake
of communal offerings and worship, all of those are called theoroi. And a theoric
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payment is given to the Athenians not because of the spectacles, as Caecilius
supposes, but because it was given during festivals for the sake of showing honour to
the gods, making offerings, and experiencing delight.
90. Thuesthai differs from sphattesthai. This is because thuesthai concerns the
worship of a god, and we say that thuesthai is “to form a prophecy through viscera.”
Sphattesthai is to kill according to some cause. The first is said of the irrational, the
second is said of a human.
91. Thebaioi and Thebageneis differ. Didymus says in his Memorandum of the
Paianes of Pindar, “The Thebageneis send a tripod of gold from this place first to
Ismenius. What, then, is the difference between the Thebageneis and the Thebaioi?
Ephoros says, ‘And so these people were drawn up to Boeotia, the Thebans personally
led the tribes neighbouring the Athenians after many years. And so the commingled
people came from many places, and they were distributed across the land below
Cithaeron and opposite Euboia; these people were called altogether Thebageneis,
because they came to be among the other Boiotians through the Thebans.’191”192
92. Thuousi and thuontai differ. Those who kill the sacrificial animals thuousi,
those who form prophecies through the viscera thuontai.
93. It is said that thuran and thuraian differ. For a thuraia is “that which is just
before the doorway,” a thura is “the one present from the beginning,” as Menander
says in the Parakatatheke.193
94. Thalamás, as in agathás, and thalámas, as in megálas, are said to differ, as
Tryphon says in his second work on Attic Prosody. 194 For if the accent is pronounced
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with an oxytone, it will be clear that it refers to the place of the Dioscuri; if the accent
is pronounced with a baritone, thalámas as in megálas, it signifies places of descent.
95. Thólos and tholós differ. A thólos is “the structure which they now call a
kamara;” tholós is “the ink of the cuttle-fish.”
96. Thes, latris, amphipolos, and atmenos are said to differ. For a thes is “one
who slaves away for money.” A latris is “one who has been captured in the midst of
war and has been forced into slavery.” Amphipolos is the name for both male and
female servants. An atmenos is not only a slave, but also a subjected free person.

Beginning of iota
97. Isthi and ginou are said to differ. Homer uses isthi to mean ginoske,
“Know (isth’) all these things, so that you may say them to your wife,”195 and the
plural form iste as opposed to ginoskete. And Euripides says in the Chrysippus, “…,”
and Menander, “Know (isthi) well,”196 and Sophocles in the Palamedes, “Know
(isthi) this, singular youth,”197 instead of ginou. And Aeschylus says in the
Choephoroi, “Know our dawn.”198 And in the Alope, “Do not know this, sullen
man...you all know these facts of the law.”199
98. Italoi and Italiotai differ. For the italoi are “those who have inhabited the
land from the beginning,” but the italiotai are “such people of the Greeks who
inhabited the place after these peoples.” The same is true of both the Sikels and the
Sikeliots.
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99. Isthmos and porthmos differ. For an isthmos is “a narrow passage of land
with sea on both sides.” A porthmos is “a narrow area with different lands on either
side.”
100. Hikesthai and aphikesthai differ as Heracleides says. For hikesthai is the
opposite of elthein, aphikesthai is the opposite of epanelthein. Homer preserves this
distinction, “Harpalion, who fighting the war followed his dear father to Troy, and did
not return again to his fatherland,”200 and again, “He came to Marathon and the wide
streets of Athens.”201
101. Ioudaioi and Idoumaioi differ as Ptolemaios says in his first work on
Herod the King.202 For the Ioudaioi are those who were naturally there from the
beginning; the Idoumaioi were not initially called Idoumaioi, but Phoenicians and
Syrians; however, after they had been conquered by them and had been forced to be
circumcised, to incorporate themselves into their race, and follow their own laws, they
were called Idoumaioi. It is necessary to understand that some of the Greek historians,
since they are ignorant of the divine texts, have an incorrect understanding of the
Ioudaioi and the Idoumaioi. For those who come from Judah, the fourth son of Jacob,
are called Ioudioi, and they are descended from the child of Abraham. The Idoumaioi
descend from Esau, brother of Jacob, son of Isaac, who was the son of Abraham, and
were born in Edom.

Beginning of kappa
102. Kurios and despotes differ. For a kurios is “the husband of a wife and a
father of sons,” a despotes is “one who commands those bought with silver.”
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103. Kuein and tiktein differ. For kuein is “to be pregnant,” and tiktein is “to
be freed of pregnancy.” Euripides says in the Antiope, “Pregnant as I am, now I give
birth.”203
104. Koman differs from gaurian. The ancients said that koman is “to pride
oneself on something,” as Tryphon says. Now, koman is “to have long, aristocratic
hair.” Simonides says in his first iamb, “And being unwashed, do not be proud,
marvel neither at water nor your short beard, and do not place a garment of filth upon
your skin.”204
105. One who is eneos was termed kophos among the ancients, as “one who
does not make noise.” Homer says, “the soundless (kophoi) swell,”205 meaning
apsophos. And the Pythia says, “And I will hear what is silent (kophou) and I will
listen to what is unspoken,”206 since they are used in parallel. Now, however, kophos
is “one who is hard of hearing.”
106. Aristoxenus says that kitharis and kithara differ in his work on
instruments, explaining that a kitharis is a lyre and those who use it are kitharists,
whom we call lyrodoi, and a kithara is what the kitharodoi play. Aischines also in his
work Against Timarchus says in demonstration of this, “He had around himself both
kitharistai and kitharodoi.”207
107. Katoikisis and katoikesis differ, as Apollonides the Nicaean says in his
first work on falsified histories. And he says, “For katoikisis is ‘the act of foundation
commenced upon others;’ katoikesis is when a certain group themselves found cities
or take over a certain place. Such as how the Athenians have now settled around the
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acropolis, but they colonized the Ionian people. And katoikesis concerns the act of
settlement, while katoikisis is about the act of colonization.”
108. Libanos and libanotos differ. For libanos signifies both the mountain and
the plant, a libanotos is the burnt sap from the plant. Euripides conflates them in the
reverse order, using libanos to describe what is burnt, as does Sophocles in the Tereus
and Sappho, who calls a libanos libanotos.
109. Lemma is profit with two mus, lema is andreia written with one mu.
110. Lachein and klerosasthai differ. For one person is selected (lachei) from
everyone, but everyone casts a lot (klerountai).
111. Lechos and eune differ. For a lechos is “a bed,” but eune is “the bedding
upon it.” And so Penelope says, “Cast upon it the bedding (eunen), the fleeces and
cloaks.”208 She sends for the bedding, which consists of demnia and chlainai.
112. Luchnion and luchnouchos differ. For a luchnion is “the lampstand,” as
Antiphanes says in the Aphrodite, a luchnouchos is “the light.” Menander says in the
Nomothetis, “the light of another, the oil-flask of another.”209

Beginning of lambda
113. Labein and dexasthai differ. For labein is “to take from one who is not
giving.” Homer says, “But do you take the tasselled aegis in your hands...”210
Dexasthai refers to an item being offered to someone, and it is formed on account of
the right hand (dexian), and the right hand itself on account of the verb dexasthai,
“She accepted (dekto) the beautiful goblet from fair-cheeked Themis.”211
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Beginning of mu
114. How meirax and meirakion (“boy”) differ is said so in the difference
between geron and presbutes. Now, according to another perspective, Aristophanes
uses the noun, and so he says in the Gera, “Seeing a meirax pinching the testicles of
the meirakion...”212 Recalling this drama and after adding to the verse, Didymus says
that a meirax is female, and a meirakion is male.
115. Mneme and mneia differ. For if something is a mneme, this is not always
a mneia. If something is a mneia, then this is clearly a mneme. A mneme is related to
the impression of the soul, a mneia is an account told according to recollection. For
one who is recalling also always has remembered, but one who has recalled has not
always remembered. Still, a mneme is associated with recollection, and a mneia is a
memory of one’s prior existence, and consequently, he is a fool who uses these terms
in reverse.
116. Metabalein differs from metamorphousthai, alloiousthai, and
heteroiousthai. A metabole is a common experience, since metabolai come about
from opportunities, actions, and pleasures. And so, demonstrating the power of the
word in the Orestes, Euripides says, “The change of all things is sweet.”213
Metamorphosis is “an alteration of shape and a transformation of the body into
another character.” Alloiosis is not only the alteration of character, as Homer says,
“Now, stranger, you appear different to me than before,”214 but also another creation
of earlier belief. Heteroiosis is like the change from one body into another, like Niobe
into stone.
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117. Miseté with an oxytone and miséte with a baritone differ among the
Attics, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody. For if we pronounce it
with an oxytone, he says, it is clearly “the cause of hatred,” and if we pronounce it
with a baritone, it is “a woman inclined towards intercourse.” Archilochus says that
the difference between these words is preserved among the Dorians and the Ionians,
“miséte woman.”
118. Mache and polemos differ. A mache is an activity in wars, a polemos is a
time and preparation for mache.
119. Meria and meroi differ. For meria are “sacrifices to the gods,” meroi are
offerings which are not so.
120. Mnatai and mnesteuetai differ. For a man courts (mnatai) a woman, but a
woman seduces (mnesteuetai) a man.

Beginning of nu
121. Nearon differs from neales and prosphatos. For the water just recently
brought in is nearon; for “to draw off water” is implied by this word. Meat is
prosphaton, for the word is built from the verb phemi, which is to make a sound, from
which also comes the word phasganon. Something just recently captured is neales, for
instance a fish; it can also be used of something just eaten with salt.
122. Nees differ from ploia. Didymus says as such in his History that nees
differ from ploia.215 For nees are rounded and used to transport troops. Aristotle says
in his Justification of Wars, “During that time, after the Tarentines had been sent
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down to the war against the barbarians, Alexander the Molossian sailed away with
fifteen ships (nees), and many ploia carrying horses and infantry.”216
123. Nereidas and Nereos thugateras are said to differ. Didymus says about
the words in his Remembrance of the Victory of Bacchylides, “Moreover, there are
those who say that the Nereidas differ from the Nereos thugateras, and believe that
the thugateras are the very descendants of Doris, and call them more commonly than
others Nereidas. They believe that the descendants are six in number, the others are
more. Mnaseas says these things in this way in his works concerning Europa.”217 And
so it is plausible to say that the Nereos thugateras are those more genuinely
descended from one individual, Doris, than others, and that the Nereidas are their
relatives.
124. Nun and nuni with an iota differ, as Heracleides says in his first work on
general prosody. For the adverb is generally used in three contexts, inceptive, bygone,
and impending, such as, “Now, the game has begun,” “Now the game will begin.”
Nuni is used of in the one inceptive context.
125. Neaniskos and neanias differ. It has been discussed in the differentiation
between geron and presbutes.

Beginning of xi
126. Xoanon, bretas, and agalma differ. For a xoanon is “a smoothed likeness
of wood or ivory,” a bretas is “a likeness of a human made of copper or wood,” and
an agalma is prepared from Parian marble or some other stone.
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Beginning of omicron
127. Oikeioi and oikees are said to differ. For oikeioi are “those who come as a
result of marriage connections,” oikees are “all those who are members of the
household, both those who are slaves and those who are free.” And so Hektor says,
“And I will go to my home, so that I may see my household (oikeas),”218 “lest in
Aegialeia, the thoughtful daughter of Adrastus groan and wake her household from
their sleep,”219 and in the Odyssey, “who cared for his own life more than the slaves
whom divine Odysseus had acquired.”220
128. Oiktos differs from oiktismos. For an oiktos is “pity for the one being
pitied,” an oiktismos is “the expression of feeling pity.”
129. Ornitheutes differs from ornithoskopos. An ornitheutes is a hunter, an
ornithoskopos is a prophet.
130. Houtos and houtosi differ. Houtosi with an iota is deictic only, but houtos
is both deictic and anaphoric. It is deictic, as in, “This man, Diomedes, comes from
the camp,”221 and anaphoric, as in, “This is the best of all, he who knows everything
in himself.”222 The word itself is so, as it is in the case of touton and toutoni.
131. Ouden with a delta and outhen with a theta differ in extent. For ouden is
said in general, for instance, whenever we say, “nothing in the cosmos is empty.” The
one said with a theta is taken from oute and hen, for instance, “neither one nor two.”
And so he who conflates these is incorrect. For this reason, they guide Zenodotus as
he writes, “nothing (outhen) weaker,”223 with a theta.
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132. Oligon and mikron differ. For the first is used in regard to number, the
second is used in regard to size. Nicias says in his Memorandum of Hecale about the
line, “’few along the islet,’224 it is mikran use hypallagically. For oligon is about
number, and mikron is used regarding size.” And Homer says indistinguishably, “a
small table,”225 instead of mikran.
133. Hosia and hiera differ. For hosia are “the private items which one desires
and is able to touch,” but hiera are “the items of the gods, which one is unable to
touch.” Demosthenes says in his Against Timokrates, “And so he established this
custom, through which he despoiled the gods of their divine (hieron) property, and the
city of its holy items (hosion).”226 He said similarly, “Hosia are permitted for human
use, as if they are accessible, hiera are not permitted, as if inaccessible.”
134. Orthros and proi differ. Orthros is “the time before sunrise,” according to
which we become upright (orthos) after standing up from sleep, proi is the first part of
the day according to Homer, “early (proi) at dawn,”227 and Hesiod says someone died
“at the dawn (of his life) without ever marrying at all.”228
135. Opse and hespera differ. For hespera is “the state after the setting of the
sun.” Opse is “the time long after the setting and generally much later.” Homer says,
“When it was night (opse) he spoke.” 229
136. Houneka and heineka differ. For houneka indicates cause, heineka
indicates the purpose. Homer says, “because (houneka) Chryses,”230 and, “for the sake
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(heineka) of horrid Helen.”231 And so Callimachus incorrectly said, “not for the sake
(heineka) of one song.”232
137. Ophlein and ophelein differ. For one pays a fine (ophlei) in court, but one
is in debt (opheilei) as also we say.
138. Hoti and dioti differ. For dioti indicates the cause, and hoti sometimes
indicates cause, and other times confirmation. We immediately know that (hoti) the
moon has left, because (dioti) it is no longer there.
139. Oikade differs from eis oikon. For the first is “to proceed to one’s own
house,” and so we say oikade, the second is “to proceed to another’s house,” eis
oikon.

Beginning of pi
140. Póneron, as in sóloikon, and ponerón, as in noserón, are said to differ,
just like móchtheros and mochtherós. For wickedness is ponerós with an oxytone, but
a labour is póneros with a baritone accent. This is because the word demands wisely
from necessity to be pronounced with an oxytone. For everything formed by adding
the ending -ros has an oxytonic accent, such as kámatos, kamaterós; ólisthos,
olistherós; méli, meliterós. And if pónos and móchthos are the originals, then ponerós
and mochtherós should be oxytonic. If the Attics pronounce it with a baritone, it is not
surprising, for they rejoice in the baritone. And so they say adelphéon; so they
preserve some habit, and they display it.
141. Presbeuesthai differs from presbeuein. Presbeuesthai is “to send the
elders,” presbeuein is “to send for ambassadors.”
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142. Politai and patriotai differ. Politai are “those who have a share in the city
itself,” patriotai are “those who are not in the city according to custom.”
143. Polis and astu differ. A polis is the structure, and astu is the preparation
for a polis.
144. Frost is págetos, winter is pagetós.
145. Patria, patriokoi, and patroia differ. For patroia are “the items given
from fathers to their sons,” patrikoi are “the friends or guests,” and patria are “the
ethnicities of the fatherland.”
146. Proxenos, idioxenos, and doruxenos differ. For a proxenos concerns cities
and ethnic groups, as Thucydides says.233 A xenos is “the guest of one other person,”
and an idioxenos is the person himself. A doruxenos is “one who has become a friend
in the course of war;” for after acquiring this and being deemed worthy of guesthood,
one has been sent forth to the ransom taken from war.
147. Pelastes and penestes differ. The first is “one who seeks protection,” a
penestes is “one who has been sold to others or enslaved during the course of war,” as
the Helots were among the Laconians.
148. Plousios differs from aphneios and olbios. For one who has a great deal
of property is plousios; one who gathers property from the year is aphneios; one who
has perfect fortune is olbios.
149. Penes and ptochos differ. For penes comes from labouring and toiling
throughout one’s life; a beggar is ptochos, which Homer supports from etymology,
saying, “But cowering (ptosson) throughout the countryside he intends to fill his
belly.”234
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150. Parechein and parechesthai differ. For one provides (parechei) dresses,
drinking cups, and such, but displays (parechetai) their thoughts and opinions.
151. Pedalion and plethrion differ. For pedalion is said of boats, plethrion is
said of rafts.
152. Paidiske and pais differ. For a paidiske is “a free girl among the Attics,”
a pais is “a slave girl.”
153. Paidion, paidarion, paidiskos, and pais differ. For a paidion is “one being
fed by a wet-nurse,” a paidarion is “one already walking around and grasping words,”
a paidiskos is “one in the clinging age,” and a pais is “one who is able to go through
daily education.”
154. Plethos and ochlos differ. For an ochlos is properly “a disturbance,” a
plethos is “an organized group of people.”
155. Pei, poi, and pou differ. For the first two mean “to a place,” the last one
means “in a place.” And pei and poi do mean “to a place,” “Where (pei) has
Andromache gone?”235 and, “Where (poi) are you fleeing?”236 And pou plainly
indicates “in a place,” “Where (pou), now, as you came here did you leave
Hector?”237
156. Polemikos and aichmetes differ. For “one who is acquainted with war” is
polemikos, but an aichmetes is “one who skilfully uses weapons during the course of
war.”
157. Pus, pei, po, and touto differ among the Dorians. For pus is clearly an
indicator of “toward a place,” pei indicates “in a place,” and po indicates “from a
place,” as does touto. Consequently, those who doricise and say, “where (pei) are you
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going?” do so incorrectly, because pei indicates “in a place.” Sophron says, “for
where (pei) is the asphalt?” and, “where (pei) are you, destruction?” instead of “where
(pou) are you?” Whenever one intends to say “toward a place,” they say, for instance,
“where (pus) are you going, into that corner?” as if to mean, “into the abyss.”

Beginning of rho
158. Rhis and mukter differ. The rhis is “the descent from the space between
the eyebrows to the lips,” mukter refers to the apertures of the rhis, through which it is
possible to expel water.
159. Rhephanon and rhaphanon are said to differ among the Ionians and the
Attics. For rephanon is that which we say, but rhaphanon is the cabbage.
160. Rhethron differs from rheuma. For a rhethron is “the place through
which the rheuma is carried,” the rheuma is “the fluid itself.”

Beginning of sigma
161. Ptolemaios of Ascalon distinguishes staphulé with an oxytone and
staphúle with a baritone in his second work on prosody in the Odyssey. The baritone
one, he says, is “the noun used among architects to refer to a falling lead weight,” the
oxytonic one is used of fruit. And he says about the word in his second work on
prosody in the Iliad, “’ their backs, equal to a plummet,’238 staphúle must be
pronounced with a baritone as in Nióbe, for it is not the same as the fig (suke),
because the first distinguishes fruits, the second does not.”239 Our Heraclides says that
an error was made among Greek speakers as to the noun being oxytonic. Since none
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of the nouns ending in -le are feminine, they no share in the neuter gender, since the
upsilon is penultimate, it is pronounced with an oxytone, but all the neuter nouns
longer than two syllables are accented with a baritone, not an oxytone, because the
upsilon is a short vowel, as in krobúle, Kardamúle, Phaisúle – this one seems to be of
those who had tended to Dionysus, whom Lycurgos “rushed down over holy Nysa,” –
hedúle, kordúle; for this reason staphúle must be pronounced with a baritone. And so
those who pronounce it with an oxytone say that neuter nouns ending in eta are
pronounced oxytonically, apart from masculine baritone nouns ending in os; for if one
pronounces masculine nouns with an oxytone, the feminine nouns will have a
baritone, such as póthos/pothé, nómos/nomé, ônos/oné, tîmos/timé, phónos/phoné, “in
painful slaughter,”240 and conversely Danaós/Danáe. “And so,” he says, “when
stáphulos is in the masculine – for the son of Dionysus was called such –, the
feminine staphulé must be pronounced oxytonically. Against these, one must reply,
see kógchos/kóngche, phílos/phíle, mónos/móne, múlos/múle, and about the oxytonic
pronunciation, kalós/kalé, sophós/sophé, and myriad other baritones have the same
accent as baritones, and oxytones as oxytones; for this reason, it is not surprising that
it has been pronounced based on the baritone Stáphulos and the feminine staphúlen is
pronounced with a baritone.
Some, intending to come to the aid of common pronunciation and oxytonic
pronunciation, say that as many as are indistinguishable from this accent and have the
same indication, so many conflate the accent and will conflate the tone. Phílos and
phíle, and xénos and xéne and the other preceding examples are indistinguishable, for
which reason they are given the same accent, and are not distinct; accordingly
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chólos/cholé, trópos/tropé, nómos/nomé, gónos/goné, dómos/domé, stróphos/strophé,
póthos/pothé are– about this it has been said completely among others that there is a
difference. And so if Stáphulos is a masculine noun, and there is a difference in
meaning, staphulé – the fruit – is necessarily oxytonic. The reasoning is such, indeed
the preceding observation from Heraclides is valid, in so far as he recommends
making it baritone not only because of the construction following the noun, but also
because it is longer than two syllables, but the former examples are disyllabic. And so
the observation of Ptolemaius is acceptable, according to which the nouns do differ in
their accents, he says, and in their definition.
162. Semeion differs from teras. A semeion is “a signal originating from the
air,” a teras is “one in the earth.”
163. Summachein and epimachein differ. For summachein is “to be with
others,” as Didymus says, “whether enemies are upon them or they march against
others.” Epimachein is whenever they only protect those being attacked. Thucydides
has doubted this, saying in his first work on the Corcyrians that the Athenians did not
make a summachia, but an epimachia.241
164. Stratopedon differs from stratos. For they say that the stratopedon is “the
place in which the stratos resides,” like a camp for the stratos; the stratos is “the
number of those serving as soldiers.” Aeschylus says, “the army (stratos) has
resigned, after abandoning the camp (stratopedon),”242 and Homer conflates the place
with the stratos, saying, “For the paths to the stratos are many”243 and perhaps in
Attic fashion he calls the place in which the stratos resides the stratos, just as it is
used in other instances. And so he says, “You will find him staying among the pigs
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(suessi).”244 For he says suessi to mean in the place of the pigs, where they stay, and
specifies, “they are feeding by the rock of Corax.”245 Thucydides confuses the
distinction of stratos to mean stratopedon, saying “the army (stratopedon) of the
Corcyrians, as many as could hear, called out.”246 And Herodotus says, “The camp
fought so through both sides.”247
165. Semeion and tekmerion differ. Antiphon says in his first work of Skill,
“Things which have passed by are made believable by semeia, things which are yet to
come by tekmeria.”
166. Seio and soio differ in their precise understanding. For soio is a declined
pronoun, for instance, “Remember your father, Achilles, alike to the gods,”248 for it
means of your father. Seio is without an article, “And for your own life, your sons
must pay three times the ransom,”249 instead of sou, and not tou sou. And these are
preserved in Homer.
167. Skomma differs from geloios, eutrapelismos, and gephurismos. For a
skomma is “something said in disparagement of someone, as if a plot;” a geloion is
something said by those listening in merriment, without any insult;” an eutrapelon is
“something said beautifully without seriousness” – it has been described similar to a
good turn of phrase – and gephurismos comes from “to write disparagements about
someone with or without meter upon the bridges in Athens.”
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168. Stenai and stathenai differ. For stenai happens according to personal
volition, stathenai happens from the volition of another, for instance, a human stands
by himself, a statue is stood up by another.
169. Sisura and sisuris differ, as Eratosthenes demonstrates. For he says that a
sisura is “a cover crafted from the hides of goats,” and a sisuris is “a shawl fashioned
from fleece.”

Beginning of tau
170. Turannoi and basileis differ. Turannoi was said in regard to basileis.
Herodotus says regarding Croesus that he was “a turannos of the people,”250 and later,
“after the death of Alyattes, he received the kingship.”251
171. Trochós with an oxytone, as in sophós, and tróchos with a baritone, as in
nómos, differ among the Attics. For trochós they pronounce oxytonically just as we
do, but they talk about tróchoi as the words for races. Euripides says in the Medea,
“But see her children coming, after stopping their races (trochon).”252 For just as it
goes légo/lógos, pléko/plókos, phéro/phóros, so too it goes trécho/tróchos.
172. Tríetes with a baritone and trietés with an oxytone differ according to
Ptolemaius of Ascalon. For the first is accented baritonically concerning time
throughout which, and Homer says, “And so for three years (tríetes) she hid with her
trick.”253 If it should be pronounced with an oxytone, trietés, like euphués, it refers to
the age of a small child.
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173. Teichos and teichion differ. A teichos surrounds cities, a teichion
surrounds a farm.
174. Titthe and tithenos differ. And so Aristotle says in his work on children,
“Titthai comes from the fact that they provide nourishment from the breast; tithenoi
are those who undertake another task. And I say that they carry them about, play with
them, clean them, wash them, lull them to sleep, and are involved in other tasks, such
as all the care involved after weaning.”254
175. Timorein and timoreisthai differ. For timorein is “to come to the aide of
those being wronged,” timoreisthai is “to punish the wrongdoer.” Achilles was the
avenger (timoros) of Patroclus, and he punished (timoreitai) Hektor.
176. Touneka and houneka differ. For touneka is “for the sake of this,” and
houneka is “because of this.” Callimachus makes an error in the Hecale, it is proper
for him to say houneka, instead he says touneka.255
177. Tethe and tethis differ. For a tethe is “a grandmother,” a tethis is “the
sister of the father or mother,” as Aristotle says. 256

Beginning of upsilon
178. Hupopsia differs from huphorasis. For hupopsia is “the suspicion of
some evil,” huphorasis is “the reputation given for something worse.”
179. Hyposchesis differs from epangelias. For one intending to give
something worthwhile undertakes (hypischneitai), but one who intends to provide
something without demand offers (epangelletai). And so it is necessary to take care.
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Beginning of phi
180. Phlauron and phaulon differ. For a phlauron is “a small and
unsubstantial evil,” a phaulon is “a great evil.”
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APPENDIX B: Selections from Ammonius’ De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia

64. Apo and para differ. For apo is used in regard to inanimate object, such as
“from Athens.” Para is used of animate objects, for instance, “from Socrates.” Those
who conflate these make an error or they make an exchange of the preposition, as
even Homer does, “the two, going away from the ships.” (Odyssey, 14.28)

413. Protos and proteros differ. For protos concerns many, but proteros
concerns two. And a follower of the first (protos) is last, but a follower of the former
(proteros) is the latter. And proteros is used in regard to the order of things, but protos
in regard to their quality, such as whenever we say about glory in a skill that someone
is first (protos echein), just as someone is outstanding. And so Plato says that in
dividing governments, he considers one first (protos) and the other second. It is clear
that one is considered the first, and the other following it. If one should say, “He came
to Athens firstly (protos),” he is incorrect, for it is proper to say “proton.”

449. Strateia with a long syllable refers to the act, but stratia with a short
vowel is the number of the soldiers. The difference is often conflated in usage.

